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The primary purpose of this study is to perform an Initiating Event Analysis for a Lithium 
Fluoride Thorium Reactor (LFTR) as the first step of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). The 
major objective of the research is to compile a list of key initiating events capable of resulting in 
failure of safety systems and release of radioactive material from the LFTR. 
Due to the complex interactions between engineering design, component reliability and 
human reliability, probabilistic safety assessments are most useful when the scope is limited to a 
single reactor plant. Thus, this thesis will study the LFTR design proposed by Flibe Energy. An 
October 2015 Electric Power Research Institute report on the Flibe Energy LFTR asked “what-if?” 
questions of subject matter experts and compiled a list of key hazards with the most significant 
consequences to the safety or integrity of the LFTR. The potential exists for unforeseen hazards to 
pose additional risk for the LFTR, but the scope of this thesis is limited to evaluation of those key 
hazards already identified by Flibe Energy. 
These key hazards are the starting point for the Initiating Event Analysis performed in this 
thesis. Engineering evaluation and technical study of the plant using a literature review and 
comparison to reference technology revealed four hazards with high potential to cause reactor core 
damage. To determine the initiating events resulting in realization of these four hazards, reference 
was made to previous PSAs and existing NRC and EPRI initiating event lists. Finally, fault tree and 
event tree analyses were conducted, completing the logical classification of initiating events. 
Results are qualitative as opposed to quantitative due to the early stages of system design 





In summary, this thesis analyzes initiating events using previous research and inductive and 
deductive reasoning through traditional risk management techniques to arrive at a list of key 
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ARE – Aircraft Reactor Experiment 
BWR – Boiling Water Reactor 
EPRI – Electric Power Research Institute 
GFR – Gas-cooled Fast Reactor 
GIF – Generation IV Forum 
I&C – Instrumentation and Control Circuitry 
IE – Initiating Event 
LFR – Lead-cooled Fast Reactor 
LFTR – Lithium Fluoride Thorium Reactor (A specific application of MSR) 
LWR – Light Water Reactor (Generic name encompassing both PWR and BWR) 
MSBR – Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) 
MSR – Molten Salt Reactor 
MSRE – Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) 
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
ORNL – Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
PSA – Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor 
QRA – Quantitative Risk Analysis  
SCWR – Supercritical Water-cooled Reactor 
URW – Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal 
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 Ever since Enrico Fermi and his fellow engineers brought the Chicago Pile (CP-1) to 
criticality in December 1942, nuclear fission and its application in electrical power generation has 
been a source of intrigue, inspiration and controversy. The world’s first nuclear reactor, CP-1 
consisted of a rudimentary stack of uranium metal and uranium oxide fuel bricks interspersed 
between graphite blocks designed to absorb neutrons. The experiment was assembled beneath the 
west stands of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago as part of the Manhattan Project (Koppes 
n.d.). Called “a crude pile of black bricks and wooden timber” by Fermi (Kelly 2007, 83), the reactor 
was controlled by withdrawing neutron absorbent rods, allowing the neutrons to cause fission in 
the uranium fuel, which resulted in the world’s first sustained nuclear reaction. 
 In the decades that followed, nuclear fission reactions would be used in many diverse ways 
including heat production for power generation; weapons applications; and medical, chemical and 
metallurgical studies. The first generation of prototype nuclear reactors gave birth to more stable 
and safer commercial power reactors. For nearly 60 years, nuclear power was dominated by the 
use of light-water cooled reactors (LWR). Specifically, pressurized water reactors (PWR) and 
boiling water reactors (BWR) using light water (H2O) as both the coolant and neutron moderator 
were the industry standard. This momentum behind PWR and BWR technology led to streamlined 
licensure and operation at the expense of exploring alternative technologies for nuclear fission. 
By the early-2000s, after several iterations of technological advances to PWR and BWR 
technology, scientists and engineers from around the world convened a forum to discuss the future 
of nuclear fission and its role in power generation. In response to growing energy demand and in 
light of continued research demonstrating the harmful effects of fossil fuel use, the turn of the 21st 
century saw a renewed interest in the development of advanced nuclear reactor technologies as 





International Forum (GIF) represents a collective of 13 countries in which nuclear power plants are 
seen as vital for meeting future energy demands (World Nuclear Association 2016). After 
significant deliberation and review of countless proposed reactor designs, the GIF announced the 
selection of six very promising designs. Selection criteria demanded that the proposed reactor 
designs be “clean, safe and cost-effective means of meeting increased energy demands on a 
sustainable basis, while being resistant to diversion of materials for weapons proliferation and 
secure from terrorist attacks” (World Nuclear Association 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1. The Evolution of Nuclear Power Plants from Generation I to Generation IV 
(World Nuclear Association 2016) 
 
 
Ultimately, the goal of the GIF is to direct international efforts in research and development 
of these advanced nuclear reactors in order to replace the aging PWR and BWR infrastructure 
beginning as early as 2020-2030. A brief description of each of the six advanced nuclear reactor 
technologies selected by the GIF is provided below. 
 Gas-cooled Fast Reactors (GFR): The GFR is a helium-cooled reactor reliant on fast-





hexagonal elements consisting of ceramic-clad, mixed-carbide-fueled pins within a 
ceramic hexagonal tube. Helium gas will be circulated through the core of solid fuel 
where it is heated to 850°C. At the reactor outlet, the primary helium coolant rejects 
heat to a secondary helium-nitrogen mixture, which in turn drives a closed cycle gas 
turbine. The waste heat from the gas turbine heats a steam generator, which drives a 
steam turbine, resulting in a combined power cycle common in natural gas-fired power 
plants (The Generation IV International Forum 2017). 
 Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFR): The LFR is a molten lead or lead-bismuth eutectic-
cooled reactor reliant on fast-spectrum neutrons for fission of solid uranium or solid 
actinides from spent LWR fuels. The molten lead or lead-bismuth eutectic (44.5% lead, 
55.5% bismuth) primary coolant rejects heat to a closed cycle carbon dioxide gas 
turbine through heat exchangers. Waste heat from the turbine drives a steam generator 
and steam turbine in a combined cycle similar to that described for the GFR. Because of 
its high boiling point, the primary coolant in the LFR need not be pressurized. This low-
pressure reactor obviates the need for high-strength pressure vessels required in legacy 
LWRs and some other proposed advanced reactors (The Generation IV International 
Forum 2017). 
 Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFR): The SFR is a liquid sodium-cooled reactor reliant on 
fast-spectrum neutrons for fission of solid uranium-plutonium fuel, oxide or metal fuel, 
or uranium-plutonium-actinide-zirconium fuel (dependent on the reactor size). Liquid 
sodium is circulated through the core where temperatures are raised to ~550°C. In the 
primary heat exchangers, the lead coolant rejects heat to an intermediate sodium loop 
before the secondary sodium heats a closed gas cycle to drive a turbine power 





pressures; therefore, this design does not require any pressure vessels required in 
legacy LWRs (The Generation IV International Forum 2017). 
 Supercritical Water-cooled Reactors (SCWR): The SCWR is a high-temperature, high-
pressure light water-cooled reactor that operates above the thermodynamic critical 
point of water (374°C, 22.1 MPa). Similar to a BWR, the SCWR is a once-through steam 
cycle in which subcooled liquid water is raised to temperatures and pressures that 
constitute superheated steam within the core. The superheated steam is used directly to 
drive a steam turbine power conversion system. Exhausted steam is condensed and 
returned to the core using a feed pump to recommence the cycle. The SCWR offers 
significantly improved thermal efficiencies over legacy LWRs due to the high 
temperatures (500-625°C) but suffers from safety concerns with the associated high 
pressures (>20 MPa). Still, coal-fired industry has significant operating experience using 
superheated steam in power generation and many technologies may be adapted for use 
in the SCWR (The Generation IV International Forum 2017). 
 Very High-temperature Gas Reactors (VHTR): The VHTR is a helium-cooled, graphite 
moderated reactor reliant and thermal-spectrum neutrons to fission various fuel 
sources. Two types of core are being explored: the prismatic fuel block and pebble bed 
core, both of which can use open cycle uranium fuel, or closed cycle uranium-plutonium, 
thorium-uranium or mixed-oxide fuel (MOX). The VHTR is unique among Generation IV 
designs as it is primarily dedicated to cogeneration of electrical power and hydrogen 
gas. The hydrogen gas is extracted via thermo-chemical or electro-chemical processes 
driven by the extremely high temperatures of the helium gas (~1000°C). Of course, the 
high temperature of the outlet gas yields a high primary system pressure and 
necessitates pressure vessels to contain the reactor core and primary loops. The power 





the final outlet temperature of the primary helium (The Generation IV International 
Forum 2017). 
 Molten Salt Reactors (MSR): The MSR is a lithium-fluoride or lithium-beryllium-fluoride 
salt cooled reactor reliant on fast- or thermal-spectrum neutrons to fission liquid 
uranium fuel suspended in the coolant. In thermal-spectrum designs, the graphite 
moderator is positioned in the core to thermalize neutrons to facilitate fission. In all 
designs, MSRs stand out as unique in their use of liquid fuel suspended in the primary 
coolant, instead of solid fissile fuel positioned in the reactor core. Heat generated in the 
molten salt coolant is exchanged to an intermediate salt loop, which then drives a 
supercritical CO2 closed Brayton-cycle power conversion system. Because the proposed 
salts (lithium-fluoride or lithium-beryllium-fluoride) have high boiling points (1676°C) 
at atmospheric pressures, the MSR is designed to operate at low pressures similar to 
LFRs and SFRs (The Generation IV International Forum 2017). Additionally, because the 
fissile fuel material is homogenously distributed in the primary coolant and not 
concentrated in a solid matrix within the reactor core, the concept of “core meltdown” 
due to loss of cooling is obsolete. Once circulation through the reactor core stops, fission 
will not persist because the fuel is suspended within the coolant and not concentrated in 
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Table 1. Comparison of Generation IV Advanced Nuclear Reactors 
(The Generation IV International Forum 2017) 
 
 
Of the six technologies selected for future research and development, four have significant 
operating experience in research applications. Of the four technologies with previous operating 
experience, one boasts a unique and highly desirable safety feature over all others. The Molten Salt 
Reactor stands apart as the only GIF proposal that abandons the traditional design of a “solid 
nuclear fuel core” and instead relies on dissolved fissile material into a molten salt coolant. The 
safety benefit of this design concept is the complete absence of risk of “nuclear meltdown” in the 
traditional sense. That is, the most dangerous risk scenario for traditional nuclear reactors exists 
when cooling of the solid reactor core fails or is compromised. In this case, the solid nuclear fuel 
may overheat and begin to melt or deform, causing a geometry of fuel and other material whose 
nuclear fission characteristics are uncontrollable. If this occurs, the heat generated in the reactor 
core could result in failure of other structural materials and a release of radioactive fission products 
to the environment and public exposure to radiation. The risk of solid fuel meltdown is the basis for 





Fukushima Daiichi in 2011. This basic description of a “nuclear meltdown” becomes obsolete in the 
Molten Salt Reactor because the nuclear fuel is not concentrated into solid elements in a reactor 
core but is evenly disbursed in the circulating coolant. The reactor core is simply a vessel whose 
geometry and materials enable fission of the uranium fuel suspended in the coolant. Once the salt 
leaves the core, the nuclear reaction stops and heat is rejected to intermediate salt loops and then 
to CO2 which drives a gas turbine. In the event that the fuel salt overheats, a frozen plug of salt in 
the bottom of the reactor will melt away, draining the fuel salt into a subcritical collection tank 
where nuclear fission is impossible. 
The unique quality of liquid nuclear fuel makes the LFTR both inherently safe and 
revolutionary in its method of employing nuclear fission. For this simple reason, Molten Salt 
Reactors and specifically the Lithium Fluoride Thorium Reactor were selected as the subject of this 
study. Flibe Energy’s LFTR is not, however, the first example of proposed MSR technology in the 
United States. 
1.1 EARLY MOLTEN SALT REACTOR EXPERIENCE 
 The initial development and operation of molten salt reactors was performed by 
researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory following World War II. The Molten Salt Reactor 
Experiment (MSRE) and the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) represent the only two molten salt 
reactors ever built and operated in the United States. 
In 1946 the United States Air Force initiated a program to develop a nuclear-powered 
airplane under contract with Fairchild Engineering and the Airplane Corporation. In the years that 
followed, heightened tensions of the Cold War drove the US Atomic Energy Council to establish the 
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Tennessee. 
Two proposals were put forth, the first calling for air through the jet engine to directly cool fuel 
elements from the reactor, while the second called for an indirect cycle in which molten salt was 





 The indirect cycle using molten salt was researched by ORNL and resulted in the Aircraft 
Reactor Experiment (ARE), which took approximately 12 years to develop and was operational for 
only nine days. The reactor shown in Figure 2 operated at a modest 2.5 MW of thermal output at 
temperatures of ~1580°F (Rosenthal 2009, 26). Although the operation demonstrated the 
feasibility of nuclear powered aircraft, the program was halted in 1961 with the election of 
President John F. Kennedy. Still, the lessons learned in molten salt reactors and the developments in 
materials and shield design would be used in the laboratory’s next undertaking: the Molten Salt 




Figure 2. Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Aircraft Reactor Experiment (Operated in 1954) 
(Rosenthal 2009, 27). 
 
 
 The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) was funded by the Atomic Energy Council 
following successful demonstration of the technology in the ARE. Originally, two distinct designs 
were proposed that took the form of a single-fluid and a two-fluid reactor. In both variants, 





beryllium-fluoride salts, and a solid graphite matrix was constructed in the reactor core to act as a 
neutron moderator. 
 In the single-fluid variant, 235U served as fuel mixed into a single coolant salt. 232Th was also 
added to the coolant salt because of its large cross-section for neutron absorption and its ability to 
decay into 233U, which is another fissile nuclear fuel. The ability of 232Th to absorb neutrons and 
decay into fissile Uranium makes Thorium a “fertile” material. The single-fluid variant contained 
fluoride salts, 233U and 232Th all in the same volume of fluid, which circulated through the reactor 
core. 
 In the two-fluid variant, 235U is dissolved into fluoride salts and circulates through the core. 
This is known as the “fuel salt” and contains the fissile Uranium needed for fission. A second fluid, 
known as the “blanket salt” surrounds the reactor core and is separated from the fuel salt by a 
mechanical barrier, usually made of graphite (Rosenthal 2009, 29). The blanket salt contains fertile 
232Th that absorbs neutrons that have escaped the core and then decays into 233U. A separate 
chemical processing plant extracts the fissile 233U from the blanket salt and injects it into the fuel 
salt, where it will enter the core and fission to create heat. Further detail on the 233U/232Th fuel cycle 
is provided in Chapter 2, which describes the Flibe Energy LFTR in detail as a two-fluid molten salt 
reactor. 
 The MSRE was a single-fluid molten salt reactor containing lithium-, beryllium-, and 
zirconium-fluoride salts with dissolved 235U and 232Th. As the fuel salt passed through the graphite-
moderated reactor core, neutrons from decaying fission products were slowed, or “moderated” to 
energy levels that allowed absorption by the nuclear fuel and resulted in fissions. The kinetic 
energy of the fission products created heat within the fuel salt. The heat was then transferred to an 
intermediate fluoride salt and ultimately rejected to an air radiator that was cooled by blower fans. 
Sump-type salt pumps were designed as the high point of the reactor, with access that allowed 





Plutonium were used later to demonstrate the flexibility of the MSRE to utilize different fissile 
materials for fuel (Rosenthal 2009, 32). 
 The MSRE first went critical on June 1, 1965 using 235U, and was later brought critical on 
October 2, 1968 using 233U. The MSRE operated until December 1969 but was shut down due to 
budget constraints. The Atomic Energy Council had decided to redirect funds to the sodium-cooled 
fast-spectrum breeder reactor and in 1973 the molten salt reactor program was dismantled 
(Rosenthal 2009, 33). Nonetheless, significant achievements were realized during the MSRE, 
demonstrating not only the feasibility but also the inherent safety of this novel technology. Much 
advancement would be required to elevate the MSRE to an industrial scale, and government 
funding proved inadequate to support such advancements. Thus it was almost 50 years before 
universities, private investors and engineers began pursuing the revival of research on molten salt 
reactors. Flibe Energy’s LFTR stands among only a handful of MSRs under development in the 
United States today and is a direct representation of the Generation IV International Forum’s vision 








Figure 3. Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Molten Salt Reactor Experiment 
(Operated from 1965-1969) (Rosenthal 2009, p. 33) 
 
 
1.2 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTS 
In the 1970s, following two decades of successful operation of Generation I nuclear 
reactors, engineers and licensing authorities became increasingly interested in developing a 
method to capture the true magnitude of risk associated with operation of commercial nuclear 
power plants. Two key founders of the quantitative risk assessment were B. John Garrick and Stan 
Kaplan, engineers who worked together at the Atomic Energy Council and later formalized their 
quantitative approach in an article titled “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk” (1981). 
In their work, Kaplan and Garrick define the “triplet definition of risk” where the engineer 
must answer the following three questions: 
1. What can happen? 
2. How likely is it that such an event will happen? 





Answering these questions will result in a set of scenarios and their associated outcomes. 
Consider Table 2 where a list of scenarios, the likelihood or probability of occurrence and the 
consequence for each is captured. 
 
 
Scenario Likelihood Consequences 
s1 p1 x1 
s2 p2 x2 
… … … 
sn pn xn 
Table 2. Scenario List for Triplet Definition of Risk 
 
 
The ith line of Table 2 can be thought of as a triplet: 
<si , pi , xi> 
where   si is a scenario identification or description 
  pi is the probability or likelihood of that scenario (deterministic or assumed); and 
  xi is the consequence or evaluation measure (i.e. measure of damage) (Kaplan and 
Garrick 1981, 13) 
 Garrick and Kaplan's early work and continued research led to great breakthroughs in the 
field of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). In particular, the application of this approach to the 
nuclear power industry became known as Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and is used 
extensively to this day as a tool for design risk mitigation and licensure of commercial nuclear 
power plants. 
 In 1975, the first use of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment was demonstrated when the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission published the Reactor Safety Study under the direction of N.C. 
Rasmussen of M.I.T. (Garrick 2008, 248). This work took over three years to complete and included 





able to assign likelihoods of failure to different plant components, and quantify the consequences of 
these failures.  
 In his work Quantifying and Controlling Catastrophic Risk, Garrick went on to refine his 
approach to PSAs and listed the following six steps (Garrick 2008, 249) as a thorough methodology 
for capturing the “triplet” mentioned above: 
1. Define the system being analyzed in terms of what constitutes normal operation to serve as 
a baseline reference point. 
2. Identify and characterize the sources of danger, that is, the hazards (i.e. stored energy, toxic 
substances, hazardous materials etc.). 
3. Develop “what can go wrong” scenarios to establish levels of damage and consequences 
while identifying points of vulnerability. 
4. Quantify the likelihoods of the different scenarios and their attendant levels of damage 
based on the totality of relevant evidence available. 
5. Assemble the scenarios according to damage levels and cast the results into the appropriate 
risk curves and risk priorities. 
6. Interpret the results to guide the risk management process.  
Unfortunately, for advanced nuclear reactors in the design stage it is often difficult or 
impossible to quantify levels of damage as required in Step 3 or assign likelihoods of occurrence 
required by Step 4. In an international effort to guide PSA efforts for advanced nuclear reactors, one 
committee recognized that “the technical challenges of the PSA for new reactors, which are in the 
last phases of design and commissioning stage, include a lack of design detail, a lack of empirical 
data, and the possibility of failure scenarios that differ in character from those treated in PSAs for 
current reactors” (Nuclear Energy Agency 2013, 5). Another engineer notes that “epistemic 





specific hazards, data etc., are larger than that from existing reactors, and will impose a significant 
challenge to decision makers” (Alrammah 2014). 
In his work, Garrick agrees that quantitative risk assessments must be performed 
individually for different proposed reactor plants due to the inherent changes in risk probabilities 
based on design differences (Garrick 2008, 252). In observance of these limitations, analysis will be 
conducted on the proposed Flibe Energy LFTR based on the availability of design descriptions and 
existence of “what-if” analysis results for the Flibe Energy design. 
Steps 1 and 2 of Garrick’s methodology were thoroughly addressed in the “Technology 
Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015). The end result is a comprehensive list of 
important hazards that pose the most significant consequences for safety or integrity of the LFTR 
system. Step 3 of Garrick’s methodology then requires the engineer to determine “what can go 
wrong.” In this step, an initiating event analysis must be conducted to determine how the identified 
hazards may be realized. This initiating event analysis represents the first step to a Level 1 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment. Figure 4 below illustrates the development of probabilistic safety 








Figure 4. Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessments 
 
 
 This thesis falls short of satisfying the requirements of a Level 1 PSA because of the inability 
to apply probabilities and core damage frequencies due to a lack of design detail and operating 
experience. Still, the fault tree analysis and event tree analysis will prove useful to decision-makers 
and engineers in identifying vulnerabilities to the current LFTR design. 
Starting with the list of hazards identified by Flibe Energy and the EPRI, the objective of this 
thesis is to conduct an Initiating Event Analysis. Using International Atomic Energy Agency 
guidance, this process will involve a review of previous NRC and EPRI initiating events, reference to 
previous PSAs, performance of event tree analysis (inductive reasoning) and performance of fault 
tree analysis (deductive reasoning) using master logic diagrams. The goal is to develop a list of 
initiating events that may lead to a violation of the safety or integrity of the Flibe Energy LFTR as 
described in the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015). The author 
recognizes that many unforeseen or undeveloped risks may exist in addition to those identified by 
the EPRI and Flibe Energy. Later efforts to perform probabilistic safety assessments may 





discovered by elicitation of expert judgment by the EPRI. However, for the purpose of scoping this 
thesis, evaluation is limited to the list of primary hazards in Table 4-4 of the “Technology 






 To provide a foundation of technological understanding, a description of the design and 
operation of the two-fluid Flibe Energy LFTRs follows, including a breakdown of major system 
components and engineered safety features. The majority of the system design description is 
gathered from the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015) with 
supplemental information included from Oak Ridge National Laboratory MSRE and MSBR technical 
documentation. 
 In the two-fluid LFTRs, lithium-beryllium-fluoride with uranium-tetrafluoride fuel (2LiF2-
BeF2-UF4) is the primary fuel salt that will be circulated through the reactor. The blanket salt is 
comprised of lithium-beryllium-fluoride with thorium-tetrafluoride (2LiF2-BeF2-ThF4). The fuel salt 
and blanket salt are kept physically separated by the reactor vessel, which is constructed to provide 
separate plenums for each salt. As fission occurs in the reactor core, some neutrons released during 
fission leak into the blanket salt and are absorbed by fertile 232Th. This neutron absorption begins 










Using a chemical processing plant,  233U is then removed from the blanket salt and returned 
to the fuel salt to maintain the inventory of fissile fuel. Within the reactor core, a solid graphite 
moderator aids in slowing or “thermalizing” fission neutrons. Once in the thermal spectrum, the 
neutrons can be absorbed by the 233U causing fission and heat generation. Heat is then transferred 
to the fuel salt itself, which rejects heat to the intermediate loop and ultimately drives the 
supercritical CO2 power conversion system to generate electricity. An external cooling system is 





by fission of 233U must be removed from the primary fuel salt. From this basic description, the 
reader sees that there are essentially seven major subsystems: 
1. Reactor Core and Vessel 
2. Primary Fuel Salt loop 
3. Intermediate Coolant Salt loop 
4. Chemical Processing Plant 
5. Off-gas Handling Plant 
6. Power Conversion System (Supercritical CO2 Closed Brayton-cycle) 
7. External cooling system 
Because the power conversion system and external cooling system are already used in coal- 
and natural gas-fired power plants, the technology is well established and not included in the 
initiating event analysis. A more detailed description of the design and role of each new subsystem 
is provided in the following sections. 
2.1 REACTOR CORE AND VESSEL 
 The reactor core and vessel of the Flibe Energy LFTR serve several functions crucial to 
successful operation and safety of the reactor. The reactor core contains a matrix of solid graphite 
material whose large macroscopic cross-section for scattering makes it a perfect for thermalizing 
neutrons. The remainder of the reactor vessel will be constructed of Hastelloy-N and serves the 
structural purpose of separating the fuel salt and blanket salt, and directing the hot fuel salt exiting 
the core to the primary fuel salt loop (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-8). In the two-fluid 
MSR design, the fuel salt and blanket salt must be kept separate by designing the reactor vessel 
with two plenums that are physically separated to direct fuel salt through the core and maintain 
blanket salt surrounding the core. 
 Active and passive control rod systems are designed to be inserted or withdrawn from the 





rods would be made of neutron-absorbing material and controlled by a human operator. In order to 
maintain a critical reaction, the operator could insert the rods to absorb neutrons, slowing or 
stopping the nuclear reaction as desired. Another design option for the LFTR active control rod 
system is a pneumatically actuated “liquid control rod” that utilizes a column of blanket salt whose 
height is adjusted by varying the pressure of helium over the fluid. Theoretically, this liquid control 
rod would fail open during a loss of electrical power, with gas pressure being vented allowing the 
neutron-absorbent blanket salt to fill a central channel and shut down the reactor (Electric Power 
Research Institute 2015, 3-9). Additionally, novel in the LFTR is the concept of passive control rods. 
Due to the neutron-absorbing properties of the blanket salt, it has been identified that a loss of 
blanket salt would cause an increase in reactor power. To compensate for this increase in reactor 
power, passive control rods are designed to “float” on the blanket salt, remaining outside the 
reactor core during normal operations. Upon a blanket salt leak, these floating control rods would 
lose buoyancy and lower into the reactor core, slowing the nuclear reaction or shutting down the 
reactor until the casualty has been corrected. (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-9). 
 During the thorium fuel cycle following neutron-absorption in the blanket salt, 233Th β-
minus decays into 233U, which generates heat. A small heat exchanger is being designed to 
accommodate cooling of the blanket salt. Natural circulation drives the blanket salt through the 
heat exchanger to maintain proper temperatures surrounding the core. 
2.2 PRIMARY FUEL SALT LOOP 
 The Primary Fuel Salt loop serves to direct hot fuel salt from the reactor core to the primary 
heat exchangers, where heat is rejected to the intermediate loop coolant salt and then recirculated 
to the core. A primary fuel salt pump provides the pressure differential to overcome losses in the 
primary heat exchanger and the reactor core.  
 Additionally, the primary fuel salt loop contains the fuel salt drain tank and cooling system. 





cooling system. In the event of a casualty in which the fuel salt overheats, coolant flow stops or the 
active cooling capacity of the freeze plug is exceeded, the freeze plug fails open and gravity drains 
the primary fuel salt into a subcritical fuel salt drain tank (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 
3-9). Because the drain tank does not contain the required geometry of graphite to thermalize 
neutrons and cause absorption by 233U, the nuclear fission reaction will immediately cease, causing 
the fuel salt to solidify in a stable condition until corrective actions and cleanup can occur.  
2.3 INTERMEDIATE COOLANT SALT LOOP 
 The Intermediate Coolant Salt loop serves to keep the primary fuel salt physically separate 
from the power conversion system. This design serves a crucial role in plant integrity as the power 
conversion system operates at extremely high pressures (~200 Bar) (Electric Power Research 
Institute 2015, 3-10). Due to the high boiling point of the primary fuel salt, the reactor vessel and 
primary piping are not designed to accommodate high pressure.  
In the absence of an intermediate loop, a rupture in the gas heat exchanger could translate 
pressure from the CO2 gas back to the primary loop, causing a rupture and release of radioactivity 
from the primary loop. To mitigate this risk, the intermediate loop stands between the high-
pressure power conversion system and the low-pressure primary loop. Pressure relief valves 
designed into the intermediate loop would relieve pressure caused by a failure of the gas heat 
exchanger. The subsequent loss of intermediate salt would cause a loss of cooling within the 
primary, initiating the melting of the freeze plug and resulting in the complete draining of the 
primary loop into the subcritical drain tank (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-10).  
Included in the Intermediate Loop are another coolant salt pump and the salt side of the gas 








2.4 CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANT 
 The function of the chemical processing plant is to remove radioisotopes from the blanket 
salt that are generated from neutron-absorption of the fertile 232Th. These isotopes are primarily 
protactinium-233 (233Pa) and uranium-233 (233U). Ultimately, the 233U will be returned to the 
primary fuel salt loop to serve as fuel. A secondary function of the chemical processing plant is to 
remove fission products from the primary loop and prepare them for storage or shipment off-site. 
 The chemical processing plant is extremely complicated and must handle both gaseous and 
liquid metal radioactive byproducts of fission and absorption. One major safety concern is the 
production of gaseous fluorine and hydrogen, both of which are highly chemically reactive. Flibe 
Energy intends for the Chemical Processing Plant to operate primarily with human supervision but 
with limited human actuation (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-11). Due to the high 
operating temperatures and high radioactivity of fluids in the system, continued research and 
development is needed before the chemical processing plant is ready for use in the LFTR.  
 These safety concerns and the lack of proven design data will be addressed in greater detail 
in the initiating event analysis within this thesis. 
2.5 OFF-GAS HANDLING SYSTEM 
 Following fission of 233U, Xenon and Krypton gases build up in the primary loop and must be 
removed to prevent gas pockets from interrupting the hydraulic performance of the fuel salt in the 
reactor core. Fortunately, most isotopes of Xenon and Krypton formed from fission are short-lived 
and decay into stable elements within approximately 30 days (Electric Power Research Institute 
2015, 3-12). 
 The off-gas handling system serves to redirect these fission product gases to the fuel salt 
drain tank, where most of the radioactive decay will occur transforming Xenon and Krypton into 
the stable non-gaseous daughters Cesium, Rubidium, Strontium and Barium. Gaseous Krypton and 





frozen and the Xenon bottled for resale. Krypton gas still contains radioactive Krypton-85 (half-life 
of 10 years) and must be stored until complete decay. Helium gas from this process is redirected to 
the chemical processing plant for use cleaning the fuel and blanket salts (Electric Power Research 
Institute 2015, 3-12). 
The mechanical requirements to accomplish off-gas handling are relatively simple, and the 
radioisotopes are well understood as they are common between the LFTR and LWRs.  
Figure 5 represents a simplified reactor schematic including all of the major subsystems 




Figure 5. Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor 























APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 Several resources exist that guide the conduct of Probabilistic Safety Assessments. 
Primarily, the IAEA Technical Document 719 titled Defining Initiating Events for Purposes of 
Probabilistic Safety Assessments (1993) provides guidance on how to develop a complete list of 
initiating events (IEs). 
 An initiating event is defined as “an occurrence that creates a disturbance in the plant and 
has potential to lead to core damage, depending on the success or failure of the various mitigating 
systems in the plant” (International Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 7). In traditional nuclear reactors, 
core damage refers to the release of nuclear fuel and fission products from the fuel elements into 
the primary coolant. Damage to the reactor core could ultimately lead to the release of fuel or 
fission products to the surrounding environment and result in public exposure. Since the nuclear 
fuel is already homogenously distributed in the primary coolant of the LFTR, the definition of core 
damage must be slightly altered for application to molten salt reactors. For the purpose of this 
thesis, core damage for the LFTR is defined as the release of long-lived radioisotopes from the 
primary plant boundary. This could include the release of fuel salt or fission product gases from the 
primary boundary. 
 This change to the definition of core damage focuses the scope of this thesis to investigate 
only those initiating events with the potential to release long-lived radioisotopes from the primary 
plant boundary to the surrounding environment. The research questions to be addressed are  
1. Which hazard scenarios from Table 4-4 of the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt 
Reactor Design” (2015) would result in the release of long-lived radioisotopes from the 
primary plant boundary? 






 Initiating events are generally broken down into three categories: loss-of-coolant accidents 
(LOCA), transient IEs and special or “common cause” IEs. 
The LOCA refers to any mechanical failure resulting in loss of the primary coolant and is 
extremely concerning in PWR and BWR applications because it results in a rapid loss of cooling 
capability for the solid nuclear fuel (International Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 19). In the LFTR, 
where nuclear fuel and fission products are already suspended within the coolant by design, a LOCA 
itself would constitute the release of long-lived radioisotopes from the primary plant boundary. 
Therefore, any transient or special IE identified that leads to a LOCA will constitute core damage as 
defined above. 
Transient initiating events refer to those that result in a disturbance during normal plant 
operation but do not result in a loss of coolant. Still, transient IEs require either automatic or 
manual plant shutdown to prevent equipment damage or the release of radioactivity (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 20). 
Special initiating events are those that, in addition to requiring plant shutdown, also disable 
one or more safety systems intended to mitigate the risk of radioactive release (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 20). 
Determining a comprehensive list of transient and special initiating events must be done 
using several methods. Due to the lack of operating experience with MSRs and due to the 
limitations inherent to early design phase reactors, the following methods will be used to 
determine transient and special initiating events for the Flibe Energy LFTR: 
1. Engineering evaluation and technical study of the plant 
2. Review of EPRI Lists of initiating events (EPRI-NP-2230, NUREG/CR-3862, 6928, 5750, 
1829) 
3. Reference to previous Probabilistic Safety Assessments 





a. Fault Tree Analysis (deductive reasoning) 








 The first step in proceeding with the Initiating Event Analysis is to perform and engineering 
evaluation of the Flibe LFTR as described by the EPRI (2015) and attempt to determine which 
hazards may result in the release of long-lived radioactivity. A review of EPRI and NUREG Initiating 
Event Lists and reference to previous PSAs will also be conducted to determine applicability of 
previously identified initiating events to the LFTR design. 
4.1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION AND TECHNICAL STUDY OF THE PLANT 
First, consider the hazards that were identified in the “Technology Assessment of a Molten 
Salt Reactor Design” (2015).  
 
 
Table 3. Important Hazards to safety and integrity of the LFTR (Electric Power Research Institute 
2015, 4-17) 
LFTR System or 
Component 
Hazard Scenario 
Reactor Vessel and 
Containment Cell 
Unintentional control rod withdrawal 
Loss of blanket salt 
Premature criticality during filling 
Inflow of contaminants or unexpected isotopic ratio in the fuel salt 
Breakage of one or more graphite tubes 
Inadvertent release of fission product gas from reactor cell or 
containment 
Fuel Salt Processing Hydrogen reacts with fluorine in the chemical processing system 
Excess pressure in the helium bubbler 
Primary Heat Exchanger Minor failure in the primary heat exchanger 
Major failure in the primary heat exchanger 
Sealed housing for the electric drive motors for pumps fail 
Blanket Salt Processing Inadequate removal of Pa or U from the blanket salt 
Electrolytic cell is improperly operated 
Off-gas Handling System Potassium hydroxide is released 
Drain Tank Improper or inadequate cooling of the drained fuel salt 






 Through careful consideration of the discussions in Appendix A of the “Technology 
Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015) the following hazards were selected for further 
study: 
 Unintentional control rod withdrawal 
 Breakage of one or more graphite tubes 
 Improper or inadequate cooling of the drained fuel salt 
 Partially thawed piece of salt plug or solid mass obstructs piping to the drain tank 
The selection process and justification for inclusion of these hazards is discussed further in 
Appendix A to this study. Before conducting an initiating event analysis for these four hazards, it is 
necessary to consider the mode of failure that is possible as a result of the realization of these 
casualties. Below is a discussion of the potential for core damage and release of long-lived 
radioactivity that may result from unintentional control rod withdrawal, breakage of graphite 
tubes, inadequate cooling of the drain tank or obstruction of the drain piping. 
4.1.1 UNINTENTIONAL CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL 
 Unintentional or unexpected withdrawal of the control rods from any reactor represents 
one of the most concerning reactivity addition casualties because of the potential to cause rapid and 
uncontrollable increase in reactivity, which in turn causes temperature increase, potential 
structural failure of core materials, and expansion of the fuel salt that may approach design limits. 
 Perhaps one of the most severe reactor accidents caused by unintentional control rod 
withdrawal occurred at the U.S. Army Stationary Low-power Reactor Number 1 (SL-1) operated at 
the National Reactor Test Station in Idaho in January 1961. At 9:01 pm on the evening of January 
3rd, firefighters and medics responded to radiation alarms and fire alarms at the SL-1 site where 
three men had been conducting routine maintenance in preparation for reactor operations in the 
coming days.  An explosion had occurred at SL-1 due to the inadvertent withdrawal of a central 





scene and one perished during resuscitation efforts. In addition to the loss of life, the SL-1 reactor 
site itself was completely destroyed by the explosion. The reactor vessel had jumped almost nine 
feet in the air, shearing connecting piping due to the blast (Thatcher n.d., 11), and several of the 
reactor control rods had been ejected from the core resulting in overheating and failure of the fuel 
cladding. After an exhaustive investigation, it was determined that inadvertent control rod 
withdrawal had caused the reactor explosion and the deaths of three military technicians who were 
on site. Part of the required maintenance called for the technicians to manually raise the control 
rods from within the core with the reactor shutdown (Thatcher n.d., 2). Accidentally raising the 
center control rod to a height of over 20 inches, one technician unknowingly added enough positive 
reactivity to cause the reactor to experience “prompt criticality,” a condition in which neutrons are 
generated so rapidly from fission that the reaction becomes uncontrollable. This condition resulted 
in a vaporization of fuel materials and a steam explosion, which ejected the center control rod and 
killed the technician instantly. This accident constituted the first nuclear accident-related fatality 
and indeed the first “reactor accident” in the United States.  
  In the aftermath of the SL-1 accident, significant improvements were made to design and 
safety requirements in modern nuclear reactors. Among them, more controlled maintenance 
evolutions and procedures were developed. More importantly, reactor designs were improved such 
that withdrawal of a single control rod could not add enough positive reactivity to cause such a 
significant power excursion. It is with the SL-1 accident in mind that the Flibe LFTR liquid control 
rod design must be critiqued and considered. 
 In the Flibe LFTR, there is discussion of use of a liquid control rod containing blanket salt 
(neutron-absorbent) that will “fail open” upon loss of power (Electric Power Research Institute 
2015, 3-9). However, another potentially damaging scenario has not been considered – rapid 
overpressurization of the blanket salt control rod that causes an almost immediate ejection of the 





control rods in modern nuclear power plants. The closest comparison is hydraulically-operated 
solid control rods, which use water to actuate pistons to raise and lower solid control rods within a 
reactor core. The concern with reliable operation of hydraulically-operated control rods is so 
important that specific safety mechanisms have been designed to prevent overpressurization of 
actuating fluid which could result in ejection of control rods (Carruth 1989). In the Flibe Energy 
LFTR System Design Description, limited design detail is offered for the proposed liquid control rod 
system. As such, assumptions are made about the basic engineering design required to accomplish 
such a system. It is assumed that a blanket-gas will be kept pressurized over the blanket salt control 
rod, maintaining a column of blanket salt of specific height in the center of the reactor core to act as 
a neutron absorber to control neutron flux. A single valve or series of valves subsequently referred 
to as the “blanket-gas control valve” will be used to govern the pressure of the blanket-gas, which in 
turn governs the liquid control rod height. Some form of overpressure protection system will be 
included to prevent rapid pressurization of the blanket-gas. The next iteration of Flibe Energy LFTR 
must include further design detail for the liquid control rod system to allow more thorough 
evaluation of the risks. Though a novel concept with potential for success, the risk of control rod 
ejection through overpressurization of a liquid control rod system has not been thoroughly 
addressed for the Flibe LFTR. 
 There are several mechanisms of failure that may result from uncontrolled rod withdrawal. 
As demonstrated in the SL-1 accident, prompt criticality and fuel vaporization represent the most 
extreme mode of failure (Thatcher n.d.). However, the expected thermal expansion of the fuel salt 
may also represent a hazard to plant integrity. In pressurized water reactors, thermal expansion 
occurs in the light water coolant circulated through the core during normal operations and power 
transients. This thermal expansion is accommodated by an expansion volume called the 
pressurizer. Any condition in which the pressurizer is not available to accommodate thermal 





because the potential exists to rapidly overpressurize the primary system and cause brittle fracture 
of the reactor vessel or primary plant piping (International Atomic Energy Agency 2010, 16). As of 
now, the Flibe Energy LFTR has no design feature to accommodate thermal expansion of the fuel 
salt during normal or casualty modes of operation. Indeed, during elicitation of expert judgment in 
May 2015, the EPRI and Flibe Energy acknowledged that design features such as surge capacitors 
must be added to the LFTR to accommodate this thermal expansion of fuel salt (Electric Power 
Research Institute 2015, A-5 and A-10).  
Consider the following discussion of the potential changes in fuel salt volume based on 
thermal expansion. Under normal operating circumstances, fuel salt will enter the reactor at 500°C 
with a density of 2005.1 kg/m3 and exit at 653°C with a density of 1952.1 kg/m3 (Electric Power 
Research Institute 2015, 3-15). Though Flibe Energy has not confirmed the total fuel salt volume of 
the LFTR, an approximation can be made based on similar proposed molten salt reactor designs. In 
Japan, the superFUJI MSR is a 2,272MWt/1,000MWe plant with a 62.0 m3 inventory of primary fuel 
salt and the FUJI-Pu MSR is a 250MWt/100MWe plant with a 12.0 m3 inventory of primary fuel salt 
(Yoshioka, et al. 2016, 24-27). By scaling the FUJI MSR designs, the 600MWt/250MWe Flibe LFTR 
may be expected to contain between 16.0-28.8 m3 of primary fuel salt for an average of 22.4 m3 of 
primary fuel salt (~50 tons). Given the expected change in density across the reactor core, it is seen 
that there is a 2.7% increase in volume of the fuel salt under normal steady state conditions alone. 
This equates to a 0.6 m3 change in volume during normal reactor operations. Under transient or 
casualty conditions, this thermal expansion could reasonably exceed 1.0 m3, necessitating some 
form of expansion volume or surge capacitor to prevent rapid overpressurization of the reactor 
vessel and primary loops. The absence of an expansion volume effectively constitutes “solid plant 
operations” and places the LFTR at risk for brittle fracture or pressurized thermal shock (Boyd 





Overall, the hazard of unintentional control rod withdrawal in the LFTR presents significant 
safety and integrity concerns. The liquid control rod concept is in the early design phase and suffers 
from a lack of detail and the potential for control rod ejection. The mechanism of failure due to 
unintentional control rod withdrawal is prompt criticality as a worst case scenario, and at the very 
least the potential for thermal expansion of fuel salt resulting in fracture of the reactor vessel or 
primary plant boundary due to the absence of any sufficient expansion volume. 
4.1.2 BREAKAGE OF ONE OR MORE GRAPHITE TUBES 
 During design and operation of the MSRE at ORNL, breakage of one or more graphite tubes 
was recognized as “the scenario that could represent the largest reactivity addition” to a molten salt 
reactor (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, A-12). Several mechanisms exist whereby 
breakage of the graphite fuel tubes or moderator elements may result in higher reactivities within 
the core. The most credible and severe accident involving the graphite moderator is a net fuel 
addition to the core region due to the expulsion of graphite and replacement with fuel salt (Kasten 
1967, 18). This would result in net positive reactivity addition and a power excursion due to higher 
fuel concentration in the core region. Still, some studies for the MSRE postulated that the net 
addition of reactivity due to replacing graphite with fuel salt would be negligible and does not 
present a safety hazard (Beall, et al. 1964, 219). Other mechanisms for reactivity increase due to 
loss of graphite or permeation by fuel salt include (Beall, et al. 1964, 219-221):  
 Bowing of the graphite moderator and fuel channels due to irradiation, resulting in higher 
localized fuel concentrations within the core region, 
 Graphite shrinkage that causes decreased moderator volume and larger fuel channels, 
 Fuel salt permeating the pores in the graphite resulting in increased amount of uranium in 
the core and higher levels of afterheat in the graphite following shutdown due to the 





 Sorption of uranium onto the graphite surface due to irradiation and fission at elevated 
temperatures causing higher reactivity levels during normal operation, higher graphite 
temperatures and higher levels of afterheat. 
Though initial safety assessments of the MSRE indicated little impact on safety due to loss of 
graphite in the core, this potential casualty must be further studied as a possible cause for core 
damage. One hazard scenario not discussed in the MSRE Safety Analysis is the potential for 
localized regions of high neutron flux due to failure of the graphite moderator. For example, in the 
event of breakage of one or more graphite tubes, fuel salt channels may be obstructed which may 
allow for regions of high temperature, high neutron flux and low fuel salt flow due to off-design 
clearances within fuel salt channels. These localized regions of higher neutron flux would not likely 
cause catastrophic power transients, which also means that automatic protective action such as a 
reactor scram would not likely occur. However, localized regions of the core may experience 
temperatures in excess of design allowance, which could result in further structural damage or at 
worst a failure of core integrity due to overheating. This casualty would be similar to a coolant 
channel blockage in LWRs where material obstruction causes insufficient flow and higher 
temperatures to occur within a localized region of the reactor core (Salama and El-Morshedy 2011). 
Coolant channel blockage in LWRs can lead to a failure of fuel cladding and the introduction of 
nuclear fuel and fission products to the primary coolant which constitutes core damage under the 
traditional definition. 
Another mode of failure may result from transport of the broken graphite moderator to the 
primary fuel salt loops or to the drain tank piping. Section 4.1.4 includes further discussion of the 
impact of the graphite moderator’s presence in the primary loops or drain tank piping. 
 Of course, determination of the feasibility of core damage in the LFTR due to breakage of the 
graphite moderator is dependent on design-specific neutronic calculations for this casualty which 





the impact of fuel salt channel blockage on core integrity in a graphite-moderated MSR such as the 
LFTR. For the purpose of this study, the author assumes that breakage of one or more graphite 
tubes has the potential to result in core damage due to localized overheating or gross addition of 
positive reactivity described by Beall et al (1964). 
4.1.3 IMPROPER OR INADEQUATE COOLING OF THE DRAINED FUEL SALT 
 In the Flibe Energy LFTR, the passively cooled subcritical drain tank stands as one of the 
most crucial components to demonstrating the “walk-away safety” advertised by designers. For 
most credible casualties resulting in overheating of the reactor fuel salt, the safety mechanism is a 
freeze plug which melts and enables draining the contents of the reactor to a subcritical drain tank 
where the nuclear reaction is impossible. Here, the drained fuel salt cools and solidifies until 
corrective action and cleanup can be performed (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-9). 
Additionally, engineers have developed two potential flowpaths into the drain tank under casualty 
conditions. The first is a dedicated piping system from the freeze plug to the drain tank, designed to 
accommodate transport of the fuel salt during an accident or during normal shutdown operations. 
The second is a catch pan beneath the reactor vessel designed to direct molten fuel salt into the 
drain tank in the event of gross reactor vessel damage (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-
25). In all cases, the drain tank is designed to utilize passive cooling where heat is rejected to the 
outside environment and no electrical power or active cooling mechanisms are required for safe 
operation.  
 If the drain tank is expected to be the cornerstone of passive safety under all casualty 
conditions, which result in fuel salt exiting the reactor core, serious consideration must be given to 
the integrity of the tank and the design-specific features, which guarantee proper performance. 
Currently, the LFTR design team proposes a single drain tank “with sufficient volume to receive the 
entire inventory of fuel salt from the primary loop” and must “incorporate sufficient passive cooling 





equilibrium inventory of fission products” (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-22). The 
specific mechanism for passive cooling is not proposed, though Appendix B presents the options of 
water, liquid metals, fused salts, organics or gases (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, B-2). 
Though Flibe Energy dismissed the impact of this hazard as “very low due to passive heat removal 
system,” a review of the literature suggests that proper design of the fuel salt drain tank is crucial to 
its integrity. 
 During design and operation of the MSRE at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1960s, 
engineers performed analyses to determine the feasibility of criticality being achieved in the fuel 
salt drain tanks. In its original configuration, the MSRE was fueled by 235U and included four salt 
drain tanks: two for fuel salt, one for coolant salt and one for flush salt. Designers acknowledged the 
remote possibility that concentration of 235U may increase as the fuel salt freezes and could result in 
criticality being achieved within the drain tank (Robertson 1965, 220). More specifically, it was 
demonstrated empirically that equilibrium cooling of fuel salt mixtures resulted in segregation of 
UF4 from the fuel salt carrier and a subsequent concentration by a factor of three in the last phases 
to freeze (Beall, et al. 1964, 230). Although the 235U-loaded MSRE required concentrations of four-
times normal or higher to achieve criticality in the drain tank, this risk was obviated completely by 
splitting the contents of the fuel salt into two separate drain tanks in the MSRE. Moreover, bayonet 
heat exchanger thimbles carrying liquid water would operate by natural circulation, with liquid 
water turning to steam while removing heat from the fuel salt (Beall, et al. 1964, 30). This system 
was meant to preclude the possibility of criticality in the fuel salt drain tanks. However, with the 
introduction of 233U to the MSRE in 1968, scientists and engineers were forced to revisit this 
possibility. 
 It was determined that the nuclear reactivity of 233U in the fuel salt drain tanks is higher 
than that of 235U, which required further analysis on the credibility of criticality and structural 





the entire contents of the fuel salt were present in a single drain tank with thimbles full of water, 
resulting in higher concentrations of uranium and the presence of a moderator in the form of liquid 
water. According to calculations, fuel salt at 1200°F with no water in the thimbles would keep the 
drain tank subcritical with a multiplication factor (keff) of 0.85. However, under the most reactive 
conditions with fuel salt at room temperature and water in the thimbles, criticality in the fuel salt 
drain tank could be achieved with keff = 1.0. Splitting the uranium inventory into two drain tanks 
resulted in a subcritical configuration with a maximum keff =0.88 (Haubenreich, et al. 1968, 68). 
Though the temperature rise may not be significant (Haubenreich, et al. 1968, 69), the 
concern is valid that criticality may be achieved in the drain tanks under the right conditions. 
Elements key to successful operation of the drain tank will be detailed neutronic calculations on the 
feasibility of criticality, estimated temperature changes under conditions of criticality, and selection 
of appropriate passive cooling systems. Currently, the Flibe Energy LFTR is considering use of a 
convective air cooling system similar to the direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS) loop 
which is also used in the fluoride-cooled high temperature reactor (FHR) (Electric Power Research 
Institute 2015, 4-15). Use of air convection for passive cooling removes the possibility of water 
providing neutron moderation in the drain tank. Additionally, the LFTR design must consider the 
impact of the graphite moderator entering the drain tank following breakage of one or more 
graphite tubes. This addition of moderator to the drain tank contents may also enable criticality and 
a temperature rise in the drain tanks. Because there are credible scenarios under which criticality 
and temperature rise may occur in the drain tanks, inadequate cooling of the drain tanks represents 
a real hazard, which may lead to the release of radioactivity from the reactor core to the 
surrounding environment. 
4.1.4 FAILED FREEZE VALVE OR OBSTRUCTION OF THE PIPING TO THE DRAIN TANK 
 In conjunction with the drain tanks, the freeze valve and associated drain piping represent 





casualties, safety can be shown for the LFTR when the freeze valve melts, allowing the fuel salt 
inventory to separate from the graphite moderator and drain to subcritical tanks (Electric Power 
Research Institute 2015, 3-8). Unfortunately, the EPRI evaluation of the Flibe Energy LFTR does not 
thoroughly address the hazards associated with obstruction of drain piping and focuses only on the 
occurrence of this casualty during reactor fill. Potential hazard scenarios that obstruct this crucial 
flowpath must be considered in detail for their impact on overall safety and integrity of the LFTR, 
especially during reactor operations and casualty scenarios.  
Depending on the type of obstruction, this hazard may result in different types of failure. 
Consider an obstruction in the form of partially thawed freeze plug. This may result in the fuel salt 
remaining in the reactor core, where moderation occurs and the nuclear reaction can be sustained. 
Thermal expansion of the fuel salt could result in rapid pressurization of the primary system as 
described in Section 4.1.1. In the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor design from Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, an allowance was made for overfilling or thermal expansion, which caused fuel salt to 
overflow through a standpipe into the fuel salt drain tanks (Robertson, Smith, et al. 1968, 47). 
However, the LFTR still has insufficient design features allowing for thermal expansion of the fuel 
salt, relying only on the off-gas handling lines as overflow for expanding fuel salt (Electric Power 
Research Institute 2015, A-10 and A-36).  
Additionally, criticality may be maintained in the core region due to the inability to drain 
the fuel salt to a subcritical configuration. Criticality of course means a rise in fuel salt temperatures 
with the inability to drain the core to the drain tanks. In one study, thermal calculations were 
conducted to estimate the temperature rise due only to decay heat, not including fission, during a 
casualty where fuel salt was not drained. It was determined that fuel salt would reach ~1200°C 
within 8 minutes and potentially cause core damage if the fuel salt could not be drained 






Figure 6. Temperature of the Fuel Salt during an Unprotected-loss-of-heat-sink 
(Brovchenko, et al. 2013, 338) 
 
 
Finally, research indicates that freeze valve failure could also occur if a partial thaw results 
in piping rupture due to thermal expansion of trapped fuel salt (Beall, et al. 1964, 231). Though 
rupture of the drain tank piping would ultimately drain the fuel salt into the LFTR catch pan and 
direct the salt to drain tanks, this casualty still constitutes core damage due to the release of 
radioactive material from the primary plant boundary. 
 Another mode of failure would be graphite obstruction of the drain line. The Flibe Energy 
LFTR design team did briefly address this concern in Table A-33 by asking “What if a piece of 
graphite enters the drain tank in the event of an emergency drain?” (Electric Power Research 
Institute 2015, A-36). In addition to the effects described above, namely thermal expansion of the 
undrained fuel salt and supercriticality in the core region, graphite blockage of the drain piping 
presents its own unique challenges. Unlike a partially thawed freeze plug, graphite blockage 
represents a moderator material past which the fuel salt would flow. This could result in fissions 





due to fissions outside the reactor core. Further, the graphite moderator may also make its way into 
the drain tanks introducing a neutron-moderating medium to what is intended to be a subcritical 
tank. The Flibe Energy LFTR design description briefly addresses these concerns, citing that 
graphite floats in the proposed fuel salt material (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, A-36) and 
thermal/hydraulic transport phenomena must be better understood to prevent this type of drain 
piping blockage. 
Although most experts agree on the inherent safety of the molten salt reactor due to the 
ability to rapidly drain the fuel contents to a dedicated subcritical tank, the possibility of 
obstructing the drain tank piping must be considered for its potential impact on LFTR integrity and 
safety. Obstruction of the drain tank piping may result in thermal expansion or supercritical core 
conditions, rupture of the drain piping, and the possibility of transporting the graphite moderator 
to the drain tanks where criticality outside the core region must be prevented. For these reasons, 
blockage of the drain piping is considered a credible hazard with the potential to result in core 
damage. 
4.2 REFERENCE TO EPRI AND NRC INITIATING EVENT LISTS AND PREVIOUS PSAs 
 In this section EPRI and Nuclear Regulatory Commission initiating event lists are 
considered for their applicability to the LFTR. Additionally, a review of previous PSAs for 
Generation IV Advanced Reactors is conducted to determine the applicability of initiating events to 
the LFTR. Unfortunately, due to the lack of operating experience of molten salt reactors, the EPRI 
and NRC have only published data for initiating events at PWR and BWR power plants. Still, some of 
the initiating events developed in these reports may impact the safety and integrity of the LFTR and 
will be considered for their applicability in this analysis.  
 Using hundreds of reactor-years of operating experience, the EPRI and NRC have developed 
several transient and special initiating events lists that include probabilities and frequencies of 





technology is vastly different from that proposed in the MSR, many of the initiating events compiled 
in these lists do not apply and will not be considered. However, there are some fundamental 
similarities between LWRs and MSRs in how the LFTR is expected to operate. Of the world’s 441 
operating or operational nuclear power plants, 282 are PWRs, 78 are BWRs and the remaining 81 
are heavy-water, gas-cooled, graphite-moderated or fast-breeder reactors (Nuclear Power Reactors 
2017). To limit the scope of review of EPRI and NRC initiating event lists, this study considers 
initiating event lists from only PWRs as they are more prevalent and have significantly more 
operating experience than other types of reactors. 
4.2.1 EPRI AND NRC INITIATING EVENT LISTS FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS 
Table 4 represents a list of generic EPRI Initiating Events adjacent to the results of the 




EPRI List of Initiating Events for PWR Oconee PRA List of Special and Transient IE 
1. Loss of reactor coolant flow (One loop) 1. Rod drop 
2. Uncontrolled rod withdrawal 2. Inadvertent rod withdrawal 
3. Problems with control drive 
mechanism/rod drop 
3. Rod ejection 
4. Leakage from control rods 4. Inadvertent boration or dilution 
5. Leakage in primary system 5. Reactor trip 
6. Low pressurizer pressure 6. Cold water addition 
7. Pressurizer leakage 7. Reactor coolant pump trip 
8. High pressurizer pressure 8. Reactor coolant pump seizure 
9. Inadvertent safety injection signal 9. Flow channel blockage 
10. Containment pressure problems 10. Loss of main feedwater 
11. Chemical and volume control system 
malfunction – boron dilution 
11. Excess feedwater 
12. Pressure, temperature, power 
imbalance – rod-position error 
12. Loss of condenser vacuum 
Table 4. EPRI and Oconee Nuclear Station List of IEs for PWR  






EPRI List of Initiating Events for PWR Oconee PRA List of Special and Transient IE 
13. Startup of inactive coolant pump 13. Inadequate main feedwater 
14. Total loss of RCS flow 14. Feedwater or condensate line breaks 
15. Loss or reduction in feedwater 15. Steam line breaks 
16. Loss of reactor coolant flow (One loop) 16. Rod drop 
17. Uncontrolled rod withdrawal 17. Inadvertent rod withdrawal 
18. Problems with control drive 
mechanism/rod drop 
18. Rod ejection 
19. Leakage from control rods 19. Inadvertent boration or dilution 
20. Leakage in primary system 20. Reactor trip 
21. Low pressurizer pressure 21. Cold water addition 
22. Pressurizer leakage 22. Reactor coolant pump trip 
23. High pressurizer pressure 23. Reactor coolant pump seizure 
24. Inadvertent safety injection signal 24. Flow channel blockage 
25. Containment pressure problems 25. Loss of main feedwater 
26. Chemical and volume control system 
malfunction – boron dilution 
26. Excess feedwater 
27. Pressure, temperature, power 
imbalance – rod-position error 
27. Loss of condenser vacuum 
28. Startup of inactive coolant pump 28. Inadequate main feedwater 
29. Total loss of RCS flow 29. Feedwater or condensate line breaks 
30. Loss or reduction in feedwater (one 
loop) 
30. Steam line breaks 
31. Total loss of feedwater (all loops) 31. Turbine and control valve 
malfunctions 
32. Total or partial closure of main steam 
isolation valve (one loop) 
32. Turbine-bypass valve inadvertent 
opening 
33. Closure of all main steam isolation 
valves (all loops) 
33. Turbine malfunction 
34. Increase in feedwater flow (one loop) 34. Loss of condenser circulating water 
35. Increase of feedwater flow (all loops) 35. Small reactor coolant pipe breaks 
36. Feedwater flow instability (operator 
error) 
36. Large reactor coolant pipe breaks 
37. Feedwater flow instability (mechanical) 37. Inadvertent pilot-operated relief valve 
or safety-valve opening 
38. Loss of condensate pumps (one loop) 38. Reactor coolant pump seal failure 
39. Loss of condensate pumps (all loops) 39. Control rod drive seal failure 
40. Loss of condenser vacuum 40. Interfacing system loss of coolant 
41. Steam-generator leakage 41. Reactor vessel rupture 
42. Condenser leakage 42. Steam generator tube leakage/rupture 






EPRI List of Initiating Events for PWR Oconee PRA List of Special and Transient IE 
43. Miscellaneous leakage in secondary 
system 
43. Charging exceeds letdown 
44. Sudden opening of steam relief valves 44. Letdown exceeds charging 
45. Loss of circulating water 45. Inadvertent high pressure injection 
46. Loss of component cooling 46. Failure on or off of pressurizer heaters 
47. Loss of service-water system 47. Failure on or off of pressurizer spray 
48. Turbine trip, throttle valve closure, EHC 
problems 
48. Loss of off-site power 
49. Generator trip or generator-caused 
faults 
49. Loss of power to necessary systems 
50. Loss of all off-site power 50. Loss of power to control systems 
51. Pressurizer spray failure 51. Loss of service water 
52. Loss of power to necessary plant 
systems 
52. Loss of component cooling 
53. Spurious trips – cause unknown 53. Loss of instrument air 
54. Automatic trip – no transient condition 54. Integrated control system power 
55. Manual trip – no transient condition 55. Fires affecting necessary systems 
56. Fires within the plant 56. Internal flooding affecting necessary 
systems 
 57. Generator faults 
 58. Grid disturbances 
 59. Administrative shutdowns 
 60. Main steam isolation valve closures 
 61. Anticipated transient without scram 
Table 4. Continued 
 
 
 At the onset, many of the above initiating events can be discarded as not applicable to 
molten salt reactor technology. These include pressurizer, feedwater, main steam isolation valve, 
steam generator and condenser casualties. Still, many of these systems have parallels in the LFTR 
design and thus the initiating event may be modified such that it is applicable to the MSR design. 
For example, while there is no feedwater system in the LFTR, the equivalent system is the gaseous 
CO2 to be heated for use in the closed Brayton-cycle power conversion system. In PWR applications, 





flow would represent a loss of heat sink for the LFTR coolant salt. Using this approach, initiating 
events in Table 4 were screened and altered to ensure applicability to molten salt reactor 
technology. The following initiating events were derived from Table 4 giving special consideration 
to specific LFTR subsystems and components: 
 Loss of reactor coolant flow (loss of fuel salt flow) 
 Inadvertent rod withdrawal or rod ejection (liquid control rod system failure) 
 Inadvertent control rod injection (rod drop) 
 Chemical and volume control system malfunction (Off-gas handling and chemical 
processing systems) 
 Startup of inactive fuel salt pump or coolant salt pump 
 Increase or decrease in coolant salt flow 
 Increase or decrease in CO2 flow in power conversion system (compressor failure) 
 Sudden opening of coolant salt relief valves or CO2 relief valves 
 Loss of off-site power 
 Loss of power to necessary plant systems 
 Loss of component cooling systems 
 Loss of instrument air 
 Loss of integrated control system power 
 Flow channel blockage 
 Cold fuel salt addition 
 Automatic or manual reactor trips with no transient condition 
 Fires or internal flooding affecting plant systems 
Further review of several NRC Reports resulted in a compilation of the following applicable 
initiating events for consideration in this study. Table 5 consists of initiating events gathered from 





Initiating Event Reference 
Loss of on-site and off-site AC power and failure of auxiliary cooling 
systems, high pressure injection system or reactor coolant pump 
seal failure (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission NUREG-1150 
1990, 3-1) 
Steam generator tube rupture followed by depressurization of the 
reactor coolant system 
Seismic events 
Fire within the plant 
Loss of vital AC or DC electric bus (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission NUREG/CR-
6928 2007, Appendix D) 
Loss of component cooling water system 
Loss of condenser heat sink at PWRs 
High flux due to rod withdrawal at startup (Mackowiak, Gentillon 
and Smith 1985, Table 5-
7) 
Trip of one or more feedwater pumps 
Pressurizer spray fails open/closed 
Reactivity control imbalance (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 1999, Table 
2-1) 
Reactor coolant system high pressure 
Reactor coolant system low pressure 
Table 5. Select U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Initiating Events 
 
 
 The following initiating events were derived from Table 5 giving special consideration to 
specific LFTR subsystems and components: 
 Loss of on-site and off-site AC power resulting in failure of auxiliary cooling systems 
 Coolant salt heat exchanger rupture followed by pressurization of the fuel salt loop 
 Seismic events 
 Loss of vital AC or DC electric bus 
 Reactivity control imbalance (chemical processing plant malfunction or fuel addition 
malfunction) 
 Reactor coolant system high pressure 
4.2.2 REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS PSAs FOR GENERATION IV NUCLEAR REACTORS 
Finally, a review of existing PSAs was conducted to ensure completeness of the proposed 





safety assessments for molten salt reactors. Table 6 includes those initiating events gleaned from 
existing Generation IV Reactor PSAs that are applicable to the Flibe Energy LFTR. Special care was 
given not to duplicate initiating events already developed from Tables 4 and 5 above. 
 
 
Initiating Event Reference 
Secondary shutdown system mistakenly inserted 
(Zuo, et al. 2017, 678) 
Core geometry failure 
Core coolant flow channel or area is blocked 
Secondary coolant flow channel blockage 
Air cooling tower ventilation doors get stuck 
(Zhang 2016, 395-396) 
Loss of off-site power without a scram 
Radioactive gas waste disposal system leakage or breakage 
Radioactive liquid waste disposal system leakage or breakage 
Table 6. Initiating Event List compiled from Previous Generation IV PSAs 
 
 
 The initiating events derived from Tables 4 and 5 and those identified in Table 6 are 






RESULTS AND DISCUSSION – LOGICAL CLASSIFICATION 
 In Chapter 4, technical evaluation of the LFTR plant revealed four principle hazards whose 
realization could lead to core damage and the release of radioactive isotopes from the reactor plant 
boundary. Review of existing initiating event lists and reference to previous PSAs provides a 
starting point for logical classification of specific initiating events impacting the LFTR. 
5.1 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
 Fault Tree Analysis is defined in the Fault Tree Handbook used by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission as follows: 
“Fault tree analysis is a deductive failure analysis which focuses on one particular undesired 
event and which provides a method for determining causes of this event. The undesired event 
constitutes the top event in a fault tree diagram constructed for the system, and generally 
consists of a complete, or catastrophic failure” (Vesely, et al. 1981, III-3). 
 Four fault trees were constructed, each hosting one of the four principle hazards as the 
undesired event at the top of the fault tree. Events were assigned alpha-numeric codes in each fault 
tree which aided in developing Boolean expressions for minimal cut set determination. The key for 
fault tree coding is as follows: 
 TXY: Top event 
 EXY: Intermediate event 
 CXY: Conditioning event 
 BXY: Basic event (initiating event) 
where X represents the top event and Y is an index for the quantity of events attributed to each top 
event. The X-variable takes on values as follows: 
1. Uncontrolled rod withdrawal 





3. Improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks 
4. Obstruction of the drain tank piping. 
Boolean expressions were formulated utilizing the rules described in the Fault Tree 
Handbook (Vesely, et al. 1981, IX-7) and using the laws of absorption, distribution and idempotence. 
From the Boolean expressions, minimal cut sets were determined that represent the “smallest 
combination of component failures which, if they occur, will cause the top event to occur” (Vesely, 
et al. VII-15). A qualitative analysis was conducted to evaluate vulnerabilities and areas for 
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T11 – Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal Casualty 
E11 – Continuous Solid control rod withdrawal during power or startup operations 
E12 – Liquid control rod ejection during any operating condition 
E13 – Continuous Solid control rod withdrawal during startup 
E14 – Continuous Solid control rod withdrawal during power operations 
E15 – Overpressurization of the blanket gas used to maintain liquid control rod level 
E16 – Control rod drive mechanism fails on due to instrumentation and control failure 
E17 – Blanket-gas control valve mechanically fails FULL OPEN 
E18 – Blanket-gas control valve is manually FULL OPEN 
C11 – No operator action is taken to counter an unexpected control rod withdrawal casualty 
C12 – Overpressure protection fails in the blanket-gas control system 
C13 – Blanket-gas control valve will FAIL OPEN on loss of instrument air or AC or DC control 
power (based on engineering design) 
B11 – Operator error or procedural noncompliance causes a continuous rod withdrawal 
casualty 
B12 – Rod control interlocks fail to operate to prevent rod withdrawal 
B13 – Instrumentation and control circuitry failure causes unexpected rod withdrawal 
B14 – Seismic event causes mechanical failure of the blanket-gas control valve 
B15 – Fire within the plant causes mechanical failure of the blanket-gas control valve 
B16 – Loss of instrument air to the blanket-gas control valve causes it to FAIL OPEN 
B17 – Loss of AC or DC control power causes the blanket-gas control valve to FAIL OPEN 
 
Minimal Cut Set: 
T11= (B11•B12)+(B13•C11)+(B14•C12)+(B15•C12)+(B12•C12)+(B11•C12)+ 
           (B16•C12•C13)+(B17•C12•C13) 
 
Results: 
Zero single-component minimal cut sets 
Six double-component minimal cut sets 
Two triple-component minimal cut sets 
 
 Figure 7 and Boolean reduction indicate that there are no single-component minimal cut 
sets for an uncontrolled rod withdrawal casualty, indicating that based on the availability of design 
data, it is expected that multiple initiating event conditions must be present to enable the 
uncontrolled withdrawal of either solid control rods or liquid control rods. 
 Further evaluation of the double-component minimal cut sets reveals that four of the six 
require a conditioning event, either C11 or C12 to cause the top event. These conditioning events are 





scenario) or material failure (overpressure protection of liquid control rod blanket-gas fails). The 
first condition is not further evaluated in this study as it implies human reliability analysis, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The second conditioning event, however, reveals an important 
vulnerability in the liquid control rod design: although the design “fails open” and allows the liquid 
control rod to shutdown the reactor on loss of electrical power, there is insufficient design detail to 
prove that the risk of liquid control rod ejection is properly mitigated. The triple-component 
minimal cut sets introduce yet another conditioning event, namely the condition that a loss of 
power or loss of instrument air would cause the blanket-gas control valve to fail OPEN. This of 
course is a design feature and can be engineered to have a probability of identically zero. If the 
control mechanism for the blanket-gas is engineered to fail SHUT, the risk is categorically 
prevented. However, until further design fidelity is provided for the liquid control rod mechanism, 
this condition is considered to impact the likelihood of uncontrolled rod withdrawal in the Flibe 
Energy LFTR. 
 The list of initiating events found to cause uncontrolled rod withdrawal includes: 
1. Operator error 
2. Failure of rod control interlocks 
3. Instrumentation and control failure 
4. Seismic event 
5. Fire within the plant 
6. Loss of instrument air 
7. Loss of AC or DC control power 
Note that failure of rod control interlocks and instrumentation and control failure appear as 
“undeveloped events” in the diamond shapes because detailed design specifications are not yet 





engineers should ensure that rod control interlocks and I&C circuitry address the risks identified 
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T21 – Breakage of one or more Graphite Tubes 
E21 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes during Maintenance Operations 
E22 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes during Reactor Startup 
E23 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes during Power Operations 
E24 – Breakage during Routine Inspection 
E25 – Breakage during Replacement of Graphite Tubes 
E26 – Chemical Corrosion of the Graphite Moderator during Power Operations 
E27 – Pressure surge causing breakage of graphite during Power Operations 
E28 – Overheat condition causing failure of the graphite moderator during Power Operations 
E29 – Fuel salt inventory undergoes thermal expansion during Power Operations 
E210 – Power excursion causing rapid fuel expansion during Reactor Startup 
E211 – Pressurized Fuel Salt in the Primary Loops 
E212 – Rod Withdrawal Casualty during Reactor Startup 
C21 – Insufficient Expansion Volume to accommodate fuel salt inventory expansion 
C22 – Intermediate Loop Pressure Relief Valves fail to function 
B21 – Improper handling of Graphite Tubes during Inspection or Replacement 
B22 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading to corrosion of the Graphite 
B23 – Loss of Fuel Salt Flow 
B24 – Loss of Coolant Salt Flow 
B25 – Continuous or Rapid Rod Withdrawal Casualty (Liquid or Solid Control Rod 
Configuration) 
B26 – Fuel Salt Channel Blockage 
B27 – Primary to Intermediate Loop Heat Exchanger Failure 
B28 – Intermediate Loop to CO2 Heat Exchanger Failure 
 
Minimal Cut Set: 
T21 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + (B11•C11) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) + 
  (B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22)  
 
Results: 
Six single-component minimal cut sets 
Five double-component minimal cut sets 
Zero triple-component minimal cut sets 
One quadruple-component minimal cut set 
 
 Figure 8 and Boolean reduction indicate that there are several single-component minimal 
cut sets identified above which may cause breakage of one or more graphite tubes. The first single-
component failure involves improper handling of graphite during maintenance, inspection or 





analysis is not included. It is evident that proper handling of graphite must be a priority to minimize 
the possibility of introducing loose graphite to the primary fuel salt loops.  
 The chemical processing plant is another vulnerability to the integrity of graphite 
components within the reactor core. The chemical processing plant described in the Flibe Energy 
LFTR System Design Description provides great detail on fuel processing, but offers little insight on 
potential corrosion of Hastelloy-N and graphite structural materials exposed to molten salts. A 
review of the literature indicates that the threat of corrosion and structural failure due to exposure 
to high-temperature, high-neutron flux conditions present in molten salt reactor cores is very real 
(Lane 1958, 623). Because there are many modes of failure of the chemical processing plant that 
may make the LFTR susceptible to breakage of graphite tubes, this basic initiating event was found 
to be of the first-order pending further design detail and studies demonstrating compatibility of 
graphite with the proposed fuel and blanket salts. 
 The remaining single-component minimal cut sets include loss of fuel salt or coolant salt 
flow, flow channel blockage and rod withdrawal casualty. All of these initiating events share the 
same mechanism of graphite failure – overheating of core material. These same initiating events 
reappear as double-component minimal cut sets because, in addition to the potential for overheat 
in the core these will cause a pressure surge due to thermal expansion of the fuel salt unless there is 
sufficient expansion volume engineered into the LFTR design. These basic initiating events leading 
to breakage of graphite tubes can be mitigated by design of a surge capacitor or expansion volume 
in the core. 
 Of course, the least likely hazard is a multi-dimensional failure in that the extreme 
pressures from the closed Brayton-cycle supercritical CO2 power conversion system are translated 
back through the intermediate coolant salt to the primary fuel salt by failure of heat exchangers and 
inoperable pressure reliefs. Accordingly, this hazard takes the form of a quadruple-component 





high CO2 pressures would be catastrophic, and several redundancies are recommended in the 
engineering design to preclude the possibility of the power conversion system pressures from 
reaching the reactor vessel. These redundancies could include but are not limited to pressure relief 
systems in the intermediate coolant salt and primary fuel salt loops, high-pressure rated 
intermediate and primary loops, and hardened heat exchangers. 
 The list of initiating events found to lead to breakage of one or more graphite tubes 
includes: 
1. Improper handling of Graphite Tubes during Inspection or Replacement 
2. Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading to corrosion of the Graphite 
3. Loss of Fuel Salt Flow 
4. Loss of Coolant Salt Flow 
5. Continuous or Rapid Rod Withdrawal Casualty (Liquid or Solid Control Rod 
Configuration) 
6. Fuel Salt Channel Blockage 
7. Primary to Intermediate Loop Heat Exchanger Failure 
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T31 – Improper or Inadequate Cooling of the Drain Tanks 
E31 – Criticality causes heat increase in the Drain Tanks following transfer of fuel salt 
E32 – No criticality occurs in the Drain Tanks following transfer of fuel salt 
E33 – Fuel concentration is too high due to freezing and contraction of fuel salt 
E34 – Neutron Moderator is present in the Drain Tanks to facilitate Criticality 
E35 – Failure of structural integrity of the Drain Tanks following transfer of the fuel salt 
E36 – Graphite is transferred to the Drain Tanks during drainage of the fuel salt 
E37 – Water is present in the Drain Tanks following transfer of the fuel salt 
B31 – Design Deficiency in Drain Tank geometry enables critical fuel concentrations to exist as 
the fuel freezes 
B32 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading to excessive fuel concentrations in the drained 
fuel salt 
B33 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes causes transfer of neutron moderating graphite into the Drain 
Tanks 
B34 – Design Deficiency in selection of Drain Tank cooling mechanism could cause water to be 
present following fuel salt transfer 
B35 – Seismic event before or during fuel salt transfer to the Drain Tanks 
B36 – Fire within the plant before or during fuel salt transfer to the Drain Tanks 
B37 – Design Deficiency in the selection of Drain Tank cooling mechanism causes the air-cooled 
system to fail 
 
Minimal Cut Set: 
T31 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B34 + B35 + B36 + B37 + (B11•C11) + 
                (B31•B32) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) + (B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22) 
 
Results: 
Ten single-component minimal cut sets 
Six double-component minimal cut sets 
Zero triple-component minimal cut sets 
One quadruple-component minimal cut set 
 
 Improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks is a fault tree impacted by several 
variables as a result of the lack of design detail provided for the Flibe Energy LFTR. The reference 
technologies of the MSRE and MSBR at Oak Ridge National Laboratory recognized the possibility of 
criticality in the drain tanks and made some design changes to prevent this hazard. The LFTR, 
however, does not address this possibility in sufficient detail. As such, there are many single-
component minimal cut sets that may lead to criticality or inadequate cooling until further design 





 Figure 9 and Boolean reduction indicate that the first six basic initiating events and four 
multi-component minimal cut sets listed in the T31 minimal cut set are shared with T21. Because 
breakage of graphite tubes may directly contribute to criticality inside the drain tanks, all minimal 
cut sets leading to breakage of graphite tubes are included in the basic initiating events for 
inadequate cooling of the drain tanks. 
 Unique to the T31 minimal cut set are seismic events and fires impacting structural integrity 
of the drain tanks or the passive cooling system; chemical processing plant failures resulting in high 
fuel concentration; or design deficiencies in the drain tanks or selected passive cooling mechanism 
that compromise the cooling capacity. A common theme across many of the multi-dimensional 
failures is the potential for criticality and rising temperatures of the fuel salt being stored in the 
drain tanks. Haubenreich et al. recognized the credible hazard that criticality may exist outside the 
core region depending on fuel enrichment, fuel concentration, and the presence of a neutron 
moderator in the drain tank (1968, 68). In the absence of any other design information such as 
number or configuration of drain tanks, and without sufficient discussion of the proposed passive 
cooling design (whether water-based or air-based) several minimal cut sets exist that begin with 
“design deficiency” and lead to inadequate cooling of the tanks. 
 It follows that several of the initiating events for this primary hazard are undeveloped 
events. Specifically, there are three undeveloped events considered only as “design deficiencies.” 
These include a design deficiency that would allow high enough fuel concentrations to cause 
criticality while the salt freezes (Haubenreich, et al. 1968, 68); a design deficiency in which water-
cooled drain tanks add moderator to enable nuclear fission; and a design deficiency in an air-cooled 
system that simply doesn’t have the required passive cooling capacity to prevent structural damage 
and release of fuel salt from the boundary. Until further design detail is offered by Flibe Energy and 
proof-of-concept work is complete, these undeveloped events will stand as initiating events for 





 The list of initiating events found to lead to improper or inadequate cooling of the drain 
tanks includes: 
1. Design Deficiency in Drain Tank geometry 
2. Chemical Processing Plant Failure 
3. Breakage of Graphite Tubes (moderator in the drain tanks) 
4. Design Deficiency in the selection of Drain Tank cooling mechanism (water-cooled) 
5. Seismic event 
6. Fire within the plant 
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T41 – Obstruction of the Drain Piping preventing transfer of the fuel salt from the core 
E41 – Failed freeze valve during a casualty scenario requiring drainage of the fuel salt 
E42 – Material obstruction of the drain piping during a casualty scenario requiring drainage of 
the fuel salt 
E43 – Failure to secure passive cooling to the freeze valve 
E44 – Freeze valve ruptures due to expansion of the frozen salt plug 
E45 – Loose material in the primary loops 
E46 – Overheat of fuel salt occurs during operations requiring drainage of the fuel salt 
E47 – Graphite moderator is present in the primary loops 
E48 – Failed plant components are present in the primary loops 
E49 – Failed pump components are present in the primary loops (impeller vanes, fasteners etc.) 
E410 – Failed valve components are present in the primary loops (valve discs or stems etc.) 
E411 – Failed instrumentation components are present in the primary loops 
C41 – No colander is factored into the design to prevent loose plant material from entering the 
drain piping 
B41 – Operator fails to properly secure active cooling to the freeze valve during casualty 
scenario 
B42 – Instrumentation and control failure prevents securing active cooling to the freeze valve 
B43 – Freeze valve design demonstrates vulnerability to failure during thermal expansion of the 
freeze plug 
B44 – Loss of fuel salt flow causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume 
B45 – Loss of coolant salt flow causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume 
B46 – Rod withdrawal casualty causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume 
B47 – Fuel salt channel blockage causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume 
B48 – Core geometry failure causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume 
B49 – Loss of off-site power without Scram causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume 
B410 – Seismic Event causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and primary 
loops 
B411 – Fire within the plant causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and 
primary loop 
 
Minimal Cut Set 
 
T41 = (B41•B42) + (B44•B43) + (B45•B43) + (B46•B43) + (B47•B43) +  
           (B48•B43) + (B49•B43) + (B410•C41) + (B411•C41) + (B21•C41) +  
           (B23•C41) + (B24•C41) + (B25•C41) + (B26•C41) + (B22•C41) +  
           (B11•C11•C41) + (B23•C21•C41) + (B24•C21•C41) + 
           (B25•C21•C41) + (B26•C21•C41) + (B27•B28•C21•C22•C41)  
 
Results: 
Zero single-component minimal cut sets 
Fifteen double-component minimal cut sets 
Five triple-component minimal cut sets 
Zero quadruple-component minimal cut sets 





 Figure 10 and Boolean reduction indicate that there are no single-component minimal cut 
sets for an obstruction of the drain piping. Within the double-component minimal cut sets there are 
two distinct subsets: those attributed to inadequate design and those attributed to material 
deficiencies. The risk of inadequate design resulting in failure of the freeze plug is driven primarily 
by the mechanical considerations. As discussed by Beall et al. there must be careful consideration 
during design and testing of the freeze valve to ensure proper melting of the freeze plug, preventing 
thermal expansion and rupture of the freeze plug piping (1964, 231). Additionally, the fault tree 
reveals that a partially thawed freeze plug would constitute an obstruction of the drain piping and 
can only be mitigated by proper design of the valve itself and the active cooling system keeping the 
plug frozen. 
 The remaining double-component minimal cut sets are predicated on material failure and 
the conditioning event that no perforated colander or straining device is present to preclude 
clogging of the drain piping. Material failure includes anything from the graphite tubing to failed 
valve components, check valve or globe valve discs, failed pump components such as vanes or 
fasteners, or primary plant instrumentation components that are resident in the fuel salt loop. 
These failures could be attributed to chemical corrosion, seismic events, fires or any other basic 
initiating event resulting in high temperatures or pressures in the fuel salt loop. 
 The final triple- and quintuple-component minimal cut sets are very unlikely because of the 
order of magnitude. They assume material failure of plant materials due to uncontrolled rod 
withdrawal or breakage of graphite tubes, which will lead to obstruction of the drain piping. 
 The reader will observe that a common factor for 14 of the 21 minimal cut sets is the 
conditioning event C41, the lack of a colander present upstream of the drain piping. Without a 
colander or strainer device, there is significantly increased risk that an obstruction may be 





 Finally, there are two undeveloped initiating events due to a lack of design detail in the 
LFTR System Design Descriptions. The first is an instrumentation and control failure that precludes 
securing the active cooling system. Because the operator must physically secure the active cooling 
system in all but the most severe overheat casualties to ensure the core drains, any fault that 
precludes securing cooling would pose great risk to the inherent safety of the LFTR. Secondly, the 
freeze valve mechanical design must be confirmed and tested to demonstrate repeated success in 
thawing the freeze plug without compromising the integrity of surrounding piping due to salt 
expansion. Because these two hazards cannot be further assessed, they remain undeveloped events 
but are considered basic initiating events because of their potential for damage. 
 The list of initiating events found to lead to obstruction of the drain piping includes: 
1. Operator error (failing to secure active cooling) 
2. Instrumentation and control failure prevents securing active cooling to the freeze valve 
3. Freeze valve design deficiency (thermal expansion damages freeze valve piping) 
4. Loss of fuel salt flow 
5. Loss of coolant salt flow 
6. Rod withdrawal casualty 
7. Fuel salt channel blockage 
8. Core geometry failure 
9. Loss of off-site power 
10. Seismic Event causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and primary loops 
11. Fire within the plant causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and primary 
loop 







5.2 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS 
 Event Tree Analysis is similar to Fault Tree Analysis in that it explores the sequence of 
events leading from initiating event to system or subsystem failure. However, whereas Fault Tree 
Analysis uses “top-down” or deductive reasoning, Event Tree Analysis uses “bottom-up” or 
inductive reasoning. Event trees were constructed for each of the significant initiating events 
determined in previous sections. In some cases, initiating events that could be categorized into 
more broad groups were used to illustrate that many event sequences are common to several basic 
initiating events. 
 Traditional event tree analysis calls for the assignment of probabilities to each branch in the 
event tree. However, due to the lack of operating experience and limited design data for lithium 
fluoride thorium reactors, probabilities were omitted in favor of a qualitative binary analysis. Each 
branch of the tree was assigned a value of “Success” or “Failure” based on the possibility of failure, 
not probability. As discussed during the engineering evaluation and technical study of the LFTR, 
many hazard scenarios exist in which the top events are possible, and event trees constructed below 
reinforce the fault tree analysis results indicating which basic initiating events may possibly lead to 
each top event. Based on the findings of the event tree analysis, recommendations are made to 
improve the engineering design to properly mitigate against the failure modes identified below. 
5.2.1 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR UNCONTROLLED ROD WITHDRAWAL 
 Initiating events for uncontrolled rod withdrawal casualty were grouped into the following 










Basic Initiating Event Category 
B11 – Operator Error Human Reliability Analysis 
B12 – Rod Control Interlock failure 
Rod Control Circuitry and Protective Logic 
B13 – Instrumentation and Control error 
B14 – Seismic Event 
Catastrophic Mechanical Failure 
B15 – Fire within the Plant 
B16 – Loss of Instrument Air 
Blanket-Gas Control Valve Design 
B17 – Loss of AC or DC Control Power 
Table 7. Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal Initiating Event Categories 
 
 
 As previously mentioned, human reliability analysis is not performed within this study and 
event trees were not constructed for operator error as an initiating event. Similarly, rod control 
circuitry and protective logic remain undeveloped events due to the premature design phase of the 
LFTR and event trees cannot reasonably be constructed due to a lack of design detail. As such, 
catastrophic mechanical failure of the liquid control rod blanket-gas valves and poor blanket-gas 































 Seen in Figure 11, catastrophic mechanical failure of the blanket-gas control valve can be 
shown to lead to uncontrolled rod withdrawal. If the control valve fails, high pressure air will be 
applied to the top of the blanket salt liquid control rod, causing rapid reduction of the salt column, 
in effect ejecting the control rod. The only engineered system to combat this casualty would be 
some form of overpressure protection for the blanket-gas, whose failure also constitutes a step 




Figure 12. Event Tree for URW – Engineering Design Deficiency in Blanket-gas Control Valve 
 
 
 Figure 12 demonstrates the same event sequence leading to failure as that shown in Figure 
11, namely that the application of high pressure air will eject the liquid control rod in the absence of 
any overpressure protection mechanism. The one major difference is in the mode of failure that 
leads to applying high pressure air to the blanket-gas. Figure 11 assumes a seismic event or fire that 
leads to the catastrophic failure of the control valves. In Figure 12, a certain engineering design is 
assumed in which the control valves fail OPEN, such as in the use of a solenoid-operated valve or 
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of power or instrument air would lead to the uncontrolled application of high pressure blanket-gas 
causing rapid expulsion of the liquid control rod. Of course, mitigation of this risk is simple and 
requires only that the blanket-gas control valves be designed to fail SHUT, preventing the rapid 
pressurization of the liquid control rod during loss of power or loss of instrument air casualties. 
5.2.2 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR BREAKAGE OF ONE OR MORE GRAPHITE TUBES 
 Initiating events for the breakage of one or more graphite tubes were grouped into the 
following broad categories for Event Tree Analysis: 
 
 
Basic Initiating Event Category 
B21 – Improper Handling of Graphite Tubes 
during Inspection or Replacement 
Improper Graphite Handling 
B22 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading 
to corrosion of Graphite 
Chemical Processing Plant Failure 
B23 – Loss of fuel salt flow 
Loss of Heat Sink 
B24 – Loss of coolant salt flow 
B25 – Continuous rod withdrawal casualty 
Excess Reactivity 
B26 – Fuel salt channel blockage 
B27 – Primary to Intermediate Loop Heat 
Exchanger Failure 
Heat Exchanger Failure 
B28 –Intermediate Loop to CO2 Heat Exchanger 
Failure 
Table 8. Breakage of one or more Graphite Tubes Initiating Event Categories 
 
 
 All basic initiating events identified in Table 8 were evaluated using event trees with the 
exception of Improper handling of the graphite tubes during maintenance or inspection. This 
initiating event is trivial and would lead directly to the breakage of the graphite moderator. 
Additionally, this initiating event is mitigated by procedural and administrative requirements as 





involve human reliability analysis, the improper handling of graphite is recognized as a basic 
initiating event but is not further analyzed for its corresponding event sequence.  
 
 
Figure 13. Event Tree for Breakage of Graphite Tubes – Chemical Processing Plant Failure 
 
 
 The potential exists for failure of the graphite tubes due to exposure to chemical corrosion 
and high-temperature, high-neutron flux conditions within the core (Lane 1958, 623). Figure 13 
depicts the event sequence from an initial failure or malfunction in the chemical processing plant, 
leading to chemical corrosion of the graphite. If chemistry control procedures and periodic graphite 



























Figure 14. Event Tree for Breakage of Graphite Tubes – Loss of Heat Sink or Excess Reactivity 
 
 
 Basic initiating events B23 through B26 were categorized and combined into one event tree 
shown in Figure 14. The loss of heat sink or excess reactivity casualties represented by the four 
basic initiating events from Table 8 all immediately lead to thermal expansion of the fuel salt. In a 
reactor fundamentally designed to operate at low pressures, the thermal expansion of the fuel salt 
represents a risk for pressure rise and fracture of primary plant components. Several protective 
mechanisms exist to mitigate this risk, including an expansion volume to accommodate expanding 
fuel salt and overpressure protection in the form of pressure relief valves. If these mitigations fail 
and high pressure or temperature conditions permeate the reactor core, breakage of one or more 
















































Figure 15. Event Tree for Breakage of Graphite Tubes – Heat Exchanger Failure 
 
 
 Finally, the failure of the CO2 / Intermediate Coolant Salt Heat Exchanger may also lead to 
breakage of one or more graphite tubes due to the translation of extremely high pressures of the 
closed Brayton-cycle power conversion system back to the fuel salt loop. As discussed in the 
associated fault tree analysis, successful translation of high pressures back to the fuel salt loop 
requires several coincident failures and is therefore very unlikely. However, as seen in Figure 15, if 
the CO2 / Intermediate Heat Exchanger fails and overpressure protection of the coolant salt loop is 
inoperable, the high pressure could rupture the Primary / Intermediate heat exchanger. In the 
absence of an expansion volume or primary pressure reliefs, this high pressure would cause a 
pressure surge and possible breakage of one or more graphite tubes in the reactor core. 
5.2.3 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR IMPROPER OR INADEQUATE COOLING OF DRAIN TANKS 
Initiating events for the improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks were grouped 










































Basic Initiating Event Category 
B31 – Design Deficiency – Drain Tank Geometry 
Drain Tank Design Deficiency 
B34 – Design Deficiency – Water-cooled 
Mechanism  
B37 – Design Deficiency – Air-cooled 
mechanism 
B32 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure results 
in increased fuel concentrations 
Chemical Processing Plant Failure 
B33 – Breakage of one or more graphite tubes Moderator in Drain Tanks 
B35 – Seismic Event 
Catastrophic Mechanical Failure 
B36 – Fire within the plant 
Table 9. Improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks Initiating Event Categories 
 
 
 Event tree analysis for the improper or inadequate cooling of drain tanks was challenging 
because of the limited discussion in the Flibe LFTR Technology Assessment on design of the tanks 
or the cooling circuit. A review of the literature indicates credible hazards exist that are not yet 
accounted for by the LFTR design. Basic initiating events B31, B34 and B37 are all predicated with 
“Design deficiency” because, in the absence of more detailed plans, these inadequacies could lead 
directly to improper cooling of the drain tanks. These design deficiencies are not evaluated in event 
tree format but are recognized as vulnerabilities, and will be included in the final discussion and 








Figure 16. Event Tree for Improper or Inadequate cooling of the Drain Tanks – Chemical 
Processing Plant Failure 
 
 
 The event sequence in Figure 16 depicts how failure of the chemical processing plant could 
serve as a basic initiating event for criticality in the drain tanks. Based on the research conducted 
by Beall et al. for the MSRE, normal fuel concentrations may increase by a factor of three as the fuel 
salt freezes and contracts while in the drain tanks (1964, 230). This was determined to be sufficient 
to cause keff = 1.0 and allow criticality in the drain tanks even without a moderator such as graphite 
or water present. Any further increase in fuel concentration, such as is possible during a chemical 
processing plant malfunction, would only worsen the potential for criticality to occur within the 
drain tanks. Other factors, such as drain tank geometry and neutron moderator are appropriately 
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 Though previously identified and evaluated as a top event, the breakage of graphite tubes 
also represents a basic initiating event for improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks 
because it represents the potential for moderator to be hydraulically transported into the drain 
tanks. In the fault tree analysis, minimal cut set determination further reduced breakage of graphite 
tubes into its basic initiating events. This process was not repeated to conduct event tree analysis; 
instead, breakage of graphite tubes was treated as its own initiating event to focus on engineering 
design recommendations that would preclude the introduction of moderator to the drain tanks. As 
seen in Figure 17, breakage of graphite could lead to transport to the drain piping. At this stage of 
the event tree, an opportunity exists to introduce a new design detail to prevent transport of loose 
material into the drain piping and tanks. In pressurized water reactors, perforated colanders are 
frequently used to encourage thorough mixing of coolant and prevent transport of debris into 
piping subsystems (Rhodes and McGregor 2008; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2004, 363). 
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Graphite could be prevented from transporting into the drain tanks by a similar device not yet 
described in the Flibe Energy LFTR. Finally, a water-cooled circuit would inherently introduce more 
neutron moderator to the tanks and is not advised.  
5.2.4 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR OBSTRUCTION OF THE DRAIN PIPING 
Initiating events for obstruction of the drain piping were grouped into the following broad 
categories for Event Tree Analysis: 
 
 
Basic Initiating Event Category 
B41 – Operator error (failure to secure freeze 
plug active cooling) 
Human reliability analysis 
B42 – Instrumentation and Control failure to 
secure freeze plug active cooling 
Reactor Protection Circuitry and Logic 
B43 – Freeze valve design vulnerable to 
thermal expansion failure 
Freeze Valve design deficiency 
B44 – Loss of fuel salt flow 
Loss of Heat Sink B45 – Loss of coolant salt flow 
B49 – Loss of off-site power without scram 
B46 – Continuous rod withdrawal casualty 
Excess Reactivity B47 – Fuel salt channel blockage 
B48 – Core geometry failure 
B410 – Seismic Event 
Catastrophic Mechanical Failure 
B410 – Fire within the plant 
Table 10. Obstruction of Drain Piping Initiating Event Categories 
 
 
 Initiating events involving human reliability analysis and undeveloped engineering design 
(B41 through B43) were omitted from event tree analysis. Consequently, basic initiating events B44 
through B411 are evaluated in Figures 18 and 19 below to determine the event sequence from 






Figure 18. Event Tree for Obstruction of the Drain Piping – Catastrophic Mechanical Failure 
 
 
 The event sequence identified above for seismic events or fires within the plant confirms 
the associated fault tree analysis, indicating a clear path from catastrophic mechanical failure of 
graphite or other plant materials to obstruction of drain piping. As identified in the engineering 
evaluation, obstruction of the piping could have important consequences due to the inability to 
separate fuel from moderator under casualty scenarios. Important opportunities for prevention of 
this hazard are material selection and engineering design to mitigate the possibility of mechanical 
failure in the first place; empirical testing demonstrating the credibility of hydraulic transport; and 








































Figure 19. Event Tree for Obstruction of the Drain Piping – Loss of Heat Sink or Excess Reactivity 
 
 
 The loss of heat sink and excess reactivity initiating event categories have similar event 
sequences in the LFTR because both cause an increase in core temperatures and, therefore, thermal 
expansion of fuel salt. Under overheat conditions, the freeze plug is designed to melt and open the 
flowpath to the drain tanks. Failure of the freeze plug to melt quickly and fully allows for continued 
increase in core temperatures and the possibility of core damage. For this reason, a partially 
thawed freeze valve causes obstruction of the drain piping. Additionally, freeze valve failure due to 
thermal expansion and rupture of the valve body also constitutes core damage. Though the molten 
salt would ultimately flow from the ruptured pipe to the catch pan into drain tanks, the rupture 
itself represents the release of radioactivity from within the primary plant boundary. Both partial 
thawing of the freeze plug and freeze valve rupture are preventable hazards through proper 
engineering design and empirical data collection demonstrating the probability of occurrence of 
each intermediate event.  
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It is important to identify the limitations of application of this research before proceeding to 
the conclusion and recommendations. Because the Flibe Energy LFTR is in its early design stages, 
system design descriptions lack the level of detail required for component-level failure analysis. 
Piping schematics, detailed redundant engineered safety mechanisms and instrumentation 
functionality, among other things, are notably absent from the Flibe Energy LFTR system design 
descriptions. Observing these limitations on expected plant operation at the component level, this 
thesis evaluates the principle of LFTR operation. Even in the absence of component-specific data, 
the fundamental normal plant operations were subject to initiating event analysis to provide coarse 
recommendations for design improvement. Certainly, on further development of reactor 
schematics, the Level 1 PSA must again be analyzed to provide the fine-tuning of component-
specific failure analysis and the application of probabilities of failure to arrive at true core damage 
frequencies. 
 Furthermore, the reader will note that many single-component minimal cut sets resulted 
from fault tree analysis for two of the four selected top events. Breakage of one or more graphite 
tubes and inadequate cooling of the drain tanks both contain a combined ten unique single-
component minimal cut sets. These cut sets may alarm engineers seeking to understand the safety 
of the LFTR. Again, it is important to emphasize that these results are based on the system design 
descriptions available while conducting this research. In the absence of detailed reactor and 
subsystem schematics, assumptions were made about the basic principles of operation of the LFTR. 
Some of these single-component minimal cut sets represent true vulnerabilities in the LFTR design, 
while others simply reflect a lack of adequate design detail to be evaluated further. The distinction 
between which minimal cut sets are of concern and those easily mitigated by plant design will only 





descriptions, these single-component minimal cut sets offer engineers risk-mitigation opportunities 







CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015) there were 36 
hazards identified that posed great risk to safety and integrity of the LFTR. Engineering evaluation 
and technical study revealed four of these hazards as potential causes of reactor core damage. 
These primary hazards were selected for further initiating event analysis: 
 Unintentional control rod withdrawal 
 Breakage of one or more graphite tubes 
 Improper or inadequate cooling of the drained fuel salt 
 Partially thawed piece of salt plug or solid mass obstructs piping to the drain tank. 
A thorough review of existing initiating event lists maintained by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the EPRI as well as consideration of existing PSAs for Generation IV Reactor 
Designs resulted in a list of potential initiating events whose feasibility was further evaluated using 
logical determination. Fault tree analysis and event tree analysis results were consolidated to 
reveal one key list of basic initiating events capable of leading to one or more of the four primary 
hazards identified. The majority of these initiating events are shared in common with pressurized 
water reactors: 
1. Operator Error 
2. Rod control interlock failure 
3. Instrumentation and control circuitry or protective logic failure 
4. Seismic events 
5. Fire within the plant 
6. Loss of instrument air 
7. Loss of AC or DC control power 





9. Core geometry failure 
10. Loss of off-site power without Scram 
Initiating events determined to be unique to the LFTR design are  
11. Improper handling of graphite tubes during maintenance or inspection 
12. Chemical processing plant failure 
13. Loss of fuel salt flow 
14. Loss of coolant salt flow 
15. Fuel salt channel blockage 
16. Drain tank cooling mechanism design deficiency 
17. Freeze valve design deficiency 
18. CO2 / Intermediate Coolant Salt Heat Exchanger failure 
Fault tree analysis and event tree analysis also revealed important opportunities for risk 
mitigation to preclude the occurrence of a top level hazard by interrupting the event sequence with 
engineered safety features. The safety features identified are  
 Redundant blanket-gas control valves for a liquid control rod system as well as 
overpressure protection to mitigate the risk of liquid control rod ejection 
 Fuel salt expansion volume to accommodate the thermal expansion and contraction of fuel 
salt during all modes of reactor operation 
 Fuel salt pressure relief system to mitigate pressure surges caused by thermal expansion or 
heat exchanger failure 
 Air-driven cooling circuit with demonstrated success for use in the drain tanks. Avoid the 
use of water-cooled systems to prevent inadvertent introduction of a neutron moderator 
 Perforated colander upstream of drain piping to prevent graphite or other debris from 





 Squirrel-cage induction motors for use as fuel salt and coolant salt pumps instead of 
synchronous motors, obviating the need to design a sealed electric drive motor housing 
outside of the primary containment (Appendix A contains further discussion). 
Though probabilities of occurrence were unavailable for this study, future research may 
find the groundwork provided by fault tree analysis and event tree analysis crucial in quantifying 
risks for the LFTR. The basic initiating events identified and the vulnerabilities detected during 
analysis offer planners the opportunity to review system design descriptions and properly mitigate 
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TECHNICAL REVIEW OF “WHAT-IF ANALYSIS TABLES” (EPRI 2015, A-1 to A-39) 





 Mode: Failure of liquid control rod with 
overpressurization of control gas 
 Effect: Prompt criticality (see SL-1 casualty) 
causing vaporization of core materials 
 Effect: Rapid thermal expansion of fuel salt 
with no expansion volume causing rupture 
of reactor vessel 
- (Thatcher n.d., 
11) 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, 3-9) 
- (Carruth 1989) 
- (Boyd 2008, 463) 
- (International 
Atomic Energy 
Agency 2010, 16) 
Loss of blanket salt Excluded: 
 MSRE assessed no hazard due to higher 
pressure of blanket salt compared to fuel 
salt 
 Neutronic computations needed to support 
the theory of increase in reactivity due to a 
loss of blanket salt 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, A-3) 





 Precluded by procedural compliance and 
operator supervision 






ratio in the fuel salt 
Excluded: 
 Operational/administrative procedures can 
be used to implement changes to the rate of 
fuel addition 
 Safety systems involving fast control of 
reactivity (boron tipped control rods) 




Breakage of one or 
more graphite tubes 
Included: 
 Mode: Neutron irradiation and 
embrittlement of graphite structural 
components 
 Mode: Pressure or temperature surge 
resulting in mechanical failure 
 Mode: Chemical corrosion of graphite due 
to fluoride fuel salt interaction 
 Effect: Increased reactivity due to increase 
in fuel salt inventory in the reactor core 
region 
 Effect: Blockage of fuel salt channels and 
higher neutron flux due to off-design 
clearances in fuel salt channels 
 Effect: Possible transport of graphite 
contaminant to the drain line or fuel salt 
drain tank, jeopardizing operability of the 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, A-12) 
- (Kasten 1967, 18) 








freeze plug and drain tank safety systems 
Inadvertent release 
of fission product 
gas from reactor cell 
or containment 
Excluded: 
 Several layers of designed defense by Flibe 
LFTR: 
    - Radiation sensors in containment cell 
 cover gas 
    - Operate off gas handling system at lower 
 pressure than containment cell 
    - Double walled pipe system with 
 radiation sensors 









 Procedural and administrative controls 
would preclude mixing hydrogen and 
fluorine. 
 Industry practices are being reviewed for 
hydrogen management and storage. 
 Careful separation of processes is being 
designed for the Flibe Energy LFTR. 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, A-23) 
- (Kasten 1967, 12) 
Excess pressure in 
the helium bubbler 
Excluded: 
 Overpressurization could occur to a closed 
discharge valve. Recommend mitigation by 
inclusion of multiple redundant reliefs and 
periodic testing requirements. 
 More likely result would be inability to 
remove fission products from the reactor, 
requiring plant shutdown. No risk of 
catastrophic failure. 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, A-25) 
- (Beall, et al. 1964, 
62) 




 Because the coolant salt is kept at higher 
pressures (~10-15 bar) than the fuel salt 
loop (~1-2 bar), a failure of the primary 
heat exchanger would introduce coolant salt 
to the fuel loop, reducing reactivity by 
displacing fuel. This casualty does not 
represent a hazard for a power excursion or 
core damage. 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, A-26) 




 The result of a major primary heat 
exchanger failure is a sudden increase of 
non-fissile material into the fuel salt loop, 
causing a down-power excursion and rapid 
lowering of median temperature. This 
would require plant shutdown and draining 
of the contaminated fuel salt, but does not 
present a hazard to core integrity. 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, A-26) 
Sealed housing for 
the electric drive 
motors for pumps 
fail 
Excluded: 
 Flibe Energy LFTR proposes pump design 
from the ORNL MSBR (Robertson, Smith, et 
al. 1968, 44). These pumps are vertical-shaft 








sump-type single-stage centrifugal pumps 
driven by electric motors that require access 
for maintenance. This technology preceded 
the development of squirrel cage induction 
motors, which have since become industry 
standard.  
 Squirrel cage induction motors currently 
comprise 97% of motors used in PWRs and 
94% of motors used in BWRs. They are 
resistant to degradation in the harsh 
environment within the containment 
structures of nuclear power plants and are 
proven to have a service life of ~40 years. 
Recommend using these induction motors 
to obviate the need to create sealed electric 
drive motor housings outside the primary 
containment. 
Smith, et al. 1968, 
44) 
-(Villaran and 




of Pa or U from the 
blanket salt 
Excluded: 
 Insufficient batch filling and shutdown of 
processing and reactor system will occur.  
 No hazard for core damage is discussed in 
the LFTR design or found in a review of the 
literature. 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, 4-13) 




 Improper loading of metallic lithium and 
thorium into the metallic bismuth stream 
could result in inadequate contact with the 
blanket salt, but will not change reactivity 
significantly. Low loading will cause the 
electrolytic reaction to cease. 
 Only potential hazard would be bismuth 
entering the reactor core where degradation 
of Hastelloy-N material may result. This is 
precluded by mechanical design separating 
the fluids and procedural/administrative 
processes to prevent introduction of 
bismuth. 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 






 Potassium hydroxide is an industrial safety 
concern and may result in chemical 
exposure to workers if released 
 No radiological hazard exists 





of the drained fuel 
salt 
Included: 
 Mode: Improper selection of passive cooling 
mechanism (i.e. water-cooled), which may 
encourage criticality in the drain tank 
 Mode: Inadequate design resulting in 
criticality or excessive temperatures, 
causing failure of the drain tank to the 












 Effect: The presence of a moderator in the 
drain tank (water or graphite) could enable 
criticality leading to temperature rise and 
structural failure. 
-(Haubenreich, et 
al. 1968, 68-69) 
Partially thawed 
piece of salt plug or 
solid mass obstructs 
piping to drain tank 
Included: 
 Mode: Partial thaw of the freeze valve, 
rupture of freeze valve piping due to 
thermal expansion, or graphite obstruction 
of drain tank piping 
 Effect: Inability to separate the fuel contents 
from the graphite moderator in the core 
region, resulting in sustained fission during 
casualty operations 
 Effect: Thermal expansion of fuel salt 
causing rapid pressure increase in the 
reactor vessel 
 Effect: Potential rupture of drain piping due 
to thermal expansion of freeze plug material 
 Effect: Potential fissions outside the core if 
graphite obstructs the drain piping or enters 
the drain tanks 
-(Robertson, Smith, 
et al. 1968, 47) 
- (Electric Power 
Research Institute 
2015, A-10 and A-
36) 
-(Brovchenko, et al. 
2013, 338) 










FAULT TREE ANALYSIS KEY 
 
PRIMARY EVENT SYMBOLS 
 
 Basic Event: A basic initiating fault requiring no further development. 
 
 
 Conditioning Event: Specific conditions or restrictions that apply to any logic gate 
(used primarily with PRIORITY AND and INHIBIT gates). 
 
 Undeveloped Event: An event that is not further developed either because it is of 
insufficient consequence or because information is unavailable. 
 
 External Event: An event that is normally expected to occur 
 
INTERMEDIATE EVENT SYMBOLS 
 
 Intermediate Event: A fault event that occurs because of one or more antecedent 
causes acting through logic gates. 
 
GATE SYMBOLS 
 AND-Gate: Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur. 
 
 OR-Gate: Output fault occurs if at least one of the input faults occur. 
 
 EXCLUSIVE OR-Gate: Output fault occurs if exactly one of the input faults occurs. 
 
 PRIORITY AND-Gate: Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur in a specific 
sequence (the sequence is represented by a conditioning event drawn to the right 
of the gate). 
 
 INHIBIT-Gate: Output fault occurs if the (single) input fault occurs in the presence 
of an enabling condition (the enabling condition is represented by a conditioning 
event drawn to the right of the gate). 
 
TRANSFER SYMBOLS 
 Transfer in: Indicates that the tree is developed further at the occurrence of the 
corresponding Transfer Out (e.g. on another page) 
 
 Transfer out: Indicates that this portion of the tree must be attached at the 
corresponding Transfer In. 
 







DERIVATION OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS MINIMAL CUT SETS 
 
 Minimum cut sets for each fault tree analysis diagram were developed using the “Bottom-up 
procedure” described in the Fault Tree Handbook (Vesely, et al. 1981, XI-4) for Boolean Equations. 
This procedure takes into account each intermediate event from the lowest leading up to the top 
event and translates the Boolean logic gates from the Fault Tree Analysis into their mathematical 
equivalent. By substituting basic events and conditioning events for each intermediate event, the 
minimum cut sets can be determined and qualitatively evaluated to learn more about the failures 
leading to each top event.  
 
Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal Minimum Cut Set Development 
 
E18 = B11 + B12 
E17 = B14 + B15 + B16•C13 + B17•C13 
E16 = B13 
E15 = E17 + E18 
= B14 + B15 + B16•C13 + B17•C13 + B11 + B12 
E14 = B13 + C11 
E13 = B11•C11 
E12 = E15•C12 
 = (B11 + B12 + B14 + B15 + B16•C13 + B17•C13) • C12 
 = B11•C12 + B12•C12 + B14•C12 + B15•C12 + B15•C12•C13 + B17•C12•C13 
E11 = B11•B12 + B13•C11 
T11 = E11 + E12 




           (B16•C12•C13)+(B17•C12•C13) 
 
Breakage of One or More Graphite Tubes Minimum Cut Set Development 
 
E212 = E13 = B11•C11 
E211 = B27•B28•C22 
E210 = E212 
E29 = B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + E211 
 = B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B27•B28•C22 
E28 = B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 
E27 = C21•E29 





 = B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22 
E26 = B22 
E25 = B21 
E24 = B21 
E23 = E26 + E27 + E28 
 = B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 
E22 = E210 = E212 = E13 = B11•C11 
E21 = E24 + E25 = B21 + B21 = B21 
T21 = E21 + E22 + E23 
 = B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + 
                  B24 + B25 + B26 
 
  Therefore:  
T21 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + (B11•C11) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) + 
  (B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22)  
 
Inadequate or Improper Cooling of the Drain Tanks Minimum Cut Set Development 
 
E37 = B34 
E36 = B33 = T21 
E35 = B35 + B36 
E34 = E36 + E37 = B34 + T21 
 = B34 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22 + 
   B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 
E33 = B31•B32 
E32 = E35 + B37 
 = B35 + B36 + B37 
E31 = E33 + E34 
 = B31•B32 + B34 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + 
    B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 
T31 = E31 + E32 
 = B31•B32 + B34 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + 
    B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B35 + B36 + B37 
 
Therefore: 
T31 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B34 + B35 + B36 + B37 + (B11•C11) + 
                (B31•B32) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) + (B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22) 
 
 
Obstruction of the Drain Piping Minimum Cut Set Development 
 
E411 = B410 + B411 
E410 = B410 + B411 
E49 = B410 + B411 
E48 = E49 + E410 + E411 
 = B410 + B411 + B410 + B411 + B410 + B411 = B410 + B411 
E47 = B410 + B411 + T21 
 = B410 + B411 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + 
                  B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 





E45 = E47 + E48 = B410 + B411 + B410 + B411 + T21 
 = B410 + B411 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + 
                  B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 
E44 = E46•B43  
 = (B44 + B45 + B46 + B47 + B48 + B49) •B43 
 = B44•B43 + B45•B43 + B46•B43 + B47•B43 + B48•B43 + B49•B43 
  
E43 = B41•B42 
E42 = C41•E45 
 = C41•(B410 + B411 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + 
                  B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26) 
 = B410•C41 + B411•C41 + B21•C41 + B11•C11•C41 + B22•C41 + B23•C21•C41 + 
                  B24•C21•C41 + B25•C21•C41 + B26•C21•C41 + B27•B28•C21•C22•C41 + B23•C41 + B24•C41 + 
                  B25•C41 + B26•C41 
E41 = E43 + E44 
 = B41•B42 + B44•B43 + B45•B43 + B46•B43 + B47•B43 + B48•B43 + B49•B43 
T41 = E41 + E42 
 = B41•B42 + B44•B43 + B45•B43 + B46•B43 + B47•B43 + B48•B43 + B49•B43 + B410•C41 + 
                  B411•C41 + B21•C41 + B11•C11•C41 + B22•C41 + B23•C21•C41 + B24•C21•C41 + B25•C21•C41+ 
                  B26•C21•C41 + B27•B28•C21•C22•C41 + B23•C41 + B24•C41 + 
                  B25•C41 + B26•C41 
 
  Therefore: 
T41 = (B41•B42) + (B44•B43) + (B45•B43) + (B46•B43) + (B47•B43) +  
           (B48•B43) + (B49•B43) + (B410•C41) + (B411•C41) + (B21•C41)  +  
           (B23•C41) + (B24•C41) + (B25•C41) + (B26•C41) + (B22•C41) +  
           (B11•C11•C41) + (B23•C21•C41) + (B24•C21•C41) + 
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